UK Growth: A New Chapter by Roland, Isabelle
UK GROWTH  
A New Chapter
Spinnaker Tower, Gunwharf Quay, Portsmouth, Hampshire, England, United Kingdom, Europe
1
Jobs and skills
In a world of rapidly changing technologies 
and labour markets it is essential to develop 
systems of lifelong learning to promote greater 
security and adaptability for workers. Britain’s 
tax system should be reformed to support 
companies’ investment in skills. At present 
the tax system tilts the economy in favour of 
self-employment over employee status, and 
towards investing in buildings and machines 
over staff. Tax reforms for the self-employed 
and a skills and training tax credit system are 
recommended. Boosting skills and wages in this 
way is key to supporting inclusive growth.
Industrial strategy
The government is right to focus here but 
there are gaps between this vital area and 
monetary, fiscal and competition policy. 
Industrial strategy decisions should be 
based on a new British State Aid law, clear 
operational rules and competitive tendering, 
independent oversight, and statutory 
publication of the analysis supporting 
decisions. The new industrial strategy should 
include an overarching plan on infrastructure, 
innovation and tackling shortages at all 
skill levels – including a focus on particular 
demographic groups.
Openness
The UK’s long-standing commitment to 
openness should be maintained as the UK 
forges new relationships with the EU and rest 
of the world. Britain’s strength is in services, 
and two-thirds of the country’s trade is with 
the US and EU. Negotiations must focus here: 
a trade deal with the US is needed, as is a new 
EU trade agreement with a “services passport” 
at its core. The UK must continue to engage 
strongly in international institutions for trade, 
investment, aid and public goods. Visa reforms 
must ensure that the UK’s skills shortages do 
not intensify.
Finance and growth
Despite the overall strengths in the 
UK’s financial services sector, there are 
longstanding issues in the provision of finance 
to innovative firms and for infrastructure 
projects. Government should launch a set of 
financial reforms based on promoting access, 
competition and long-termism in finance. 
Reforms should focus on improving access 
to finance for businesses and innovation, 
including flexible regulation of challenger 
banks, increased support for the FinTech 
sector, improving incentives for equity 
investment, a boosted role for the British 
Business Bank and a new infrastructure bank.
A blueprint for growth  
in 2017 and beyond
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Executive Summary 
The UK Economy is at a critical juncture. 
Leaving the EU creates economic challenges 
that necessitate widespread policy change. But 
this also generates an opportunity to tackle 
some of the long-standing challenges which 
have resulted in the UK’s productivity lagging 
behind our major competitors. Decisions made 
in the next year will have a lasting impact on 
the UK’s economic trajectory for years to come. 
If the government gets these decisions right, 
the economy will be more productive, more 
equitable and more environmentally sustainable. 
The LSE Growth Commission belongs to a long-
standing tradition of engagement between 
research, business and policy-making which has 
been the hallmark of the LSE since its foundation. 
The report draws on evidence and analytical 
arguments to make a range of concrete policy 
recommendations affecting labour markets, 
industrial strategy, trade, immigration and 
finance. Together they form a blueprint for 
growth which should command support across 
the political spectrum. 
The UK faces a number of growth challenges in the coming years. 
The issues outlined in the first report of the LSE Growth Commission 
concerning the UK’s chronic underinvestment in skills, infrastructure 
and innovation remain. The economy is growing, but this is largely 
accounted for by increases in employment rather than productivity. 
In the long run productivity is what drives prosperity, but the UK 
lags behind its peers with UK workers around 30% less productive 
on average than their counterparts in the US, Germany and France. 
Improving our productivity performance therefore must be central 
to government’s economic strategy.
Much has changed since our first report was published in 2013, 
most notably the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership. 
As Brexit becomes a reality and the UK begins to define a new 
relationship with the EU and the rest of the world, many of the 
assumptions behind the UK growth strategy of the past quarter 
century are open to debate. The UK has relied heavily on skilled 
migrant labour as a means of plugging the deficiencies of the 
education and training systems. At the same time, the strength of 
the higher education system has attracted some of the best global 
talent. The UK’s commitment to open markets and trade has been 
underpinned by its membership of the Single Market which provides 
the basis of a competitive environment for firms and has opened 
up market opportunities for UK-based businesses. Although the 
contribution of the financial sector to the UK’s success over the 
quarter century leading up to the financial crisis has often been 
exaggerated, it remains one of the UK’s core strengths. Further, the 
business services sector, and the services sector more broadly, have 
played a key role in generating UK growth. 
The Brexit vote and a general rise of anti-globalisation sentiment in 
the US and other Western democracies have brought into sharp relief 
the importance of ensuring that the benefits of economic growth 
are distributed across society. The evidence points to the importance 
of technological change, not only in creating job opportunities for 
some, but also disrupting them for others, a process which deserves 
closer attention from policy makers than it has received in the past, 
if more inclusive growth is to be realised.
In addition to the evolving political and economic landscape at 
home, a range of international developments have implications for 
UK growth. The world economy has been slow to pick up after the 
financial crisis and the view that the industrialised world is entering 
a period of “secular stagnation” has gained currency. This, coupled 
with continued instability in the Euro area and the prospect of a 
slowdown in China, creates an uncertain global outlook from which 
the UK will not be insulated.
The year 2015 was remarkable in its efforts to forge a global agenda 
with agreement on sustainable development goals and climate 
change. There is arguably more consensus on this agenda than at any 
time since the early years after the Second World War, and whether 
this will be undone by the new administration in Washington DC 
remains to be seen. Sustainable infrastructure will be key to this 
agenda in the next 15-20 years. Having been a major player in both 
agreements, the UK is well-placed to carry this agenda forward with 
a new industrial strategy and through reshaping UK infrastructure. 
The Commission has made recommendations in four areas to reflect 
Brexit issues and new government structures. 
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Labour markets and inclusive growth
The fact that employment in the UK has risen to record levels despite 
the echoes of the financial crisis and the slowdown in global growth is 
a great achievement. But the other side of Britain’s high-employment 
economy is low pay, and the rise of fragile employment status 
including self-employment and on-call (so called “gig”) workers. 
The Commission does not support proposals that would clamp 
down on these new forms of employment. At the same time, 
British policy – tax, regulatory and skills – should be tilted in favour 
of employees in low-skill sectors. At present the system is biased 
against them. The Commission recommends consulting on 
fundamental reform of the tax and minimum wage system 
so that it is neutral on forms of employment, and neutral 
between investing in machines and in people. In particular: 
•  Lifelong learning and adaptable skills. Rapidly changing 
technologies and labour markets make it essential for governments 
to promote a labour market with greater security and adaptability 
for workers, including lifelong learning.
•  Eliminate biases against employment. The advantages for firms 
and employees using self-employment as a means of avoiding 
payroll taxes and circumventing minimum wage legislation should 
cease. The classification of employment versus self-employment is 
in need of clarification and reform.
•  Eliminate biases that favour physical capital and new 
technology over human capital. Tax breaks and allowances 
for capital should be extended to a generalised tax break for “skills 
investment”. This should place investment in staff training, courses 
and education on the same footing as investment in plant and 
machinery. In nature this could be a Skills and Training tax credit, 
akin to the R&D tax credit that currently exists. 
Industrial strategy
Supporting UK business requires continued investment in skills, 
infrastructure and innovation as emphasised in our first report. These 
horizontal policies support business across the board, and there is 
also a need to continue developing policies focused on particular 
sectors, technologies or places. The current government has rightly 
put industrial strategy at the top of its policy agenda. There is a huge 
opportunity here: this area of policy is opaque, unaccountable and 
changeable and requires root and branch reform. The UK’s recent 
economic history including the reform of monetary and competition 
policy in the late 1990s, and fiscal policy (with the establishment 
of the OBR in 2010) show that huge improvements are possible 
in a short period of time. The Commission proposes a new 
institutional architecture for delivering the government’s 
emergent industrial strategy. The new system should include 
the key elements that other areas of British economic policy benefit 
from, including:
•  Law and mandate. A new law or long-lasting mandate, including 
a state aid law, and an institutional framework to implement it;
•  Policy guidelines everyone understands. A set of publicly stated 
guidelines for intervention in particular sectors, technologies or 
places, with competitive tendering where possible;
•  Independent oversight. The ultimate objective is a long-
term industrial strategy that is isolated from political cycles. An 
independent body should strive to overcome fragmentation across 
different levels of government.
•  Transparency, accountability and scrutiny. Government should 
publish a long-term plan. The body responsible for industrial strategy 
should publish a standardised Industrial Strategy Report each year 
on the state of British business, setting out policy decisions, their 
rationale, cost and impact.
The Commission sets out six key priorities that the new industrial 
strategy framework should pursue in its first long-term plan. They 
include tackling skills shortages at all levels (in particular basic skills 
deficiencies and ensuring the UK utilises and invests in female talent), 
a focus on the low-wage, low-productivity sectors that employ large 
numbers of UK workers; new steps for financial support for firms with 
high growth potential; enhanced collaboration between universities, 
government and the private sector; continued devolution of power 
and support to local leaders; and developing a set of wider public 
goals industrial strategy will support, including green technologies, 
health and social care.
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Openness
The result of the June 2016 referendum on EU membership will 
change the way goods, services, capital and people cross the UK’s 
borders. The main task for policy makers is to find a set of trade, 
investment and immigration arrangements that are best for the UK. 
The UK’s long-standing commitment to openness should be 
maintained as the UK forges new relationships with the EU 
and rest of the world. This means low tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
facilitating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and openness to global 
talent. In particular:
•  Focus on big deals. While progress with Canada and Australia 
is welcome, the UK must prioritise deals with its largest trading 
partners – the EU and the US. Striking a free trade agreement with 
the US with a focus on reducing non-tariff barriers could provide 
a blueprint for other bilateral negotiations. Government should 
also be mindful of the medium term potential of fast growing 
emerging markets. 
•  A new EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) built on services trade. 
The new deal with the EU must prioritise market access for services, 
the UK’s key area of comparative advantage. 
•  Maintain openness to investment. Trade and FDI must be 
considered in tandem. Many of the sectors where the UK is a 
strong exporter are also host to high levels of FDI and are often 
engaged in global value chains. 
•  Continue strong engagement in international institutions. 
This is essential for fostering constructive internationalism and 
the context for world trade at a time when they are under threat.
The UK must preserve its status as a magnet for talented people 
from around the world. An open approach to international talent 
complements the natural advantages – including language, time zone 
and legal system – that make the UK a good place to study, work 
or build a business. The Commission proposes that government 
should seek to:
•  Attract more skilled workers. Rather than pursuing a net 
migration target and limiting the numbers of visas for skilled 
workers granted, the UK should aspire to an increase in the stock 
of foreign-born (EU and non-EU) skilled workers living in the UK.
Finance and growth
The UK is a world-leading financial centre, and financial services 
are an important source of jobs, tax revenues and exports. Brexit 
poses a threat to the pre-eminence of the City of London and the 
associated supply chain of business services which have benefited 
from EU membership. This could have negative implications across 
the UK, since half of all financial services jobs are outside London. 
In order to avoid these, the Commission proposes:
•  A services passport. Develop a near-equivalent to the EU services 
passport (to include financial services) as a matter of urgency. 
•  Opening up to new markets. Foster new links with non-EU global 
financial centres, especially in fast-growing emerging and frontier 
markets, such as China, India, Nigeria and Kenya. The Financial 
Services Trade and Investment Board (FSTIB) should continue to 
aim to strengthen the UK’s position as the centre of emerging 
market finance.
Despite the overall strengths of the financial services sector, there are 
long-standing issues in the provision of finance to firms with high 
growth potential and for infrastructure projects. The Commission 
proposes steps to support competition in the banking sector, 
and measures to promote  long-term investment (“patient 
capital”) that can help alleviate financing constraints for fast 
growing, productive firms. In particular, the Commission proposes:
•  Challenger banks. Support the development of challenger banks 
by utilising flexibility on capital requirements that will be possible 
outside the EU. 
•  FinTech. Support the FinTech sector by granting investors access 
to tax relief schemes, such as the Equity Investment Scheme (EIS) 
and the Seed Equity Investment Scheme (SEIS).
•  SME securitisation. Create a corporate bond market for SMEs, 
including efforts to kick-start SME loan securitisation. 
•  Equity culture. Design corporate governance requirements, 
including reporting and investor engagement, to create incentives 
for long-term equity investment. 
•  The British Business Bank. Expand the role of the BBB using 
flexibilities not possible under EU rules. This added flexibility could 
give the BBB a pivotal role in supporting the UK’s Industrial Policy. 
•  A new infrastructure bank. This would help address problems 
raising finance for infrastructure projects. It is also important to 
ensure that the Green Investment Bank continues to operate 
effectively as a development bank.
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1.  A New Chapter in the 
Story of UK Growth
Much has changed since the Growth Commission’s 
first report, published in 2013. Since then the 
government has adopted new policies on skills, 
infrastructure and regional devolution. But June 
2016 marked a more fundamental shift: the 
result of the referendum on EU membership 
will fundamentally re-define the UK’s trading 
relationships both with the EU and rest of the 
world, and the “Brexit” vote led to a new Prime 
Minister and Chancellor with new economic 
priorities. This chapter provides the background 
for our new report. It starts by reviewing 
the impact of our 2013 publication, before 
summarising the important changes that have 
taken place in the UK economy since then.
The 2013 report – recommendations 
and impact
The LSE Growth Commission’s first report, “Investing for 
Prosperity,” contained recommendations in three main areas of UK 
underperformance: skills, infrastructure and innovation. Since then a 
number of our recommendations – notably on infrastructure – have 
been adopted. Other areas have seen little movement, or the UK fall 
further behind our advanced-economy peers (see Table 1.1).
Skills
Strong human capital is critical for sustainable growth. The first 
Growth Commission focused on an area where the UK has persistently 
underperformed: inadequately educated young people emerging into the 
world of work. This is widely cited as one of the key factors underlying 
our longstanding productivity gap with other large economies.
The core recommendations for improving human capital in the 
UK related to schools and included measures to improve teacher 
quality; to create a more flexible system (through greater autonomy 
for schools, parental choice, and easier growth of successful schools) 
and a greater focus on outcomes for disadvantaged pupils.
Since 2013 government policy has continued its earlier trend, with 
specific reforms implemented both in terms of the administration of 
schools and curricula. The coalition government pursued a number 
of policies to raise the quality of teaching and school leadership 
through changes to training for new and current teachers, raising 
the status of the teaching profession to attract higher calibre teachers 
and improving the quality of school leadership. There were reforms 
to link teachers’ pay to performance, and new tougher skills tests for 
trainees. Reforms continued on a similar track under the Conservative 
government of 2015-2016.
The government has continued to drive academisation of primary and 
secondary schools. We supported academisation, but suggested 
that expansion should be focused on underperforming schools 
with identified problems serving disadvantaged children. 
Today over 60% of secondary schools are academies, compared with 
around 15% of primary schools. Full academisation (or close to it) 
could occur by 2020.
While there is evidence that the secondary academies in disadvantaged 
areas set up in the early 2000s had a strong effect on pupil intake 
and on pupil performance, ongoing research on the effectiveness 
of the much larger-scale policy, including the conversion of high-
performing schools and extending the policy to primary schools since 
2010, suggests that it has no effect on students after conversion 
in most schools.1 Since restructuring the system is costly and 
potentially irreversible, the government should focus on poorly 
performing schools. Improving education is crucial for raising growth 
and reducing inequality.
More recently, the Prime Minister has announced plans to expand 
grammar schools, and they received additional funds in the Autumn 
Statement. Those in favour of such policies argue that grammar schools 
improve the opportunities for poorer children. However children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are under-represented in grammar 
schools and evidence suggests that education in non-selective schools 
is likely to suffer as the number of selective schools rises.2
1 See Eyles and Machin (2015) and Eyles, Machin and McNally (2016).
2 See Atkinson et al. (2006).
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The pupil premium (a grant for disadvantaged pupils, introduced in 
2011) was supported in our first report but the Commission suggested 
that the indicators used to identify “disadvantaged” pupils should be 
widened to include more than free school meal status. Since then, 
the level of funding per pupil has increased and eligibility for deprived 
children has been extended to those that have been in receipt of free 
school meals in the past 6 years. We also proposed that the progress 
of disadvantaged children should be given more prominence in school 
inspections. There has been progress here: Ofsted now report on how 
schools’ use of the pupil premium funding affects the attainment 
of their disadvantaged pupils, and a number of related metrics are 
included in performance tables.
Underperforming schools in disadvantaged areas find it hard to 
attract high-quality teachers. To date, school revenue allocations are 
heavily influenced by historical funding levels – the so-called “spend 
plus” methodology, which does not adequately reflect different 
local conditions, nor challenges in recruitment and retention. The 
government has been consulting on a new funding formula, 
and in December 2016 announced proposals that would 
see historically lower-funded local authorities increase their 
allocations, at the expense of schools in London and other urban 
areas that have historically received higher funds. Importantly, these 
reallocations are set against a background of real-terms cuts in 
school spending estimated at 8% per pupil by 2019-20.3 This will 
be the first time since the mid-1990s that school spending has fallen, 
and the real-terms cut is the largest since the 1970s.
These budgetary pressures risk harming educational outcomes, at a time 
when there are already concerns about the UK’s performance compared 
to other countries’.4 Despite the large-scale reforms undertaken in 
recent years, and the government’s stated aims for England to get 
the highest scores in Europe by 2020, the latest data from the OECD’s 
international student assessment (PISA) show that little has changed: 
the UK is below the OECD average in maths, and lags European 
peers, including Germany, in reading.5 In a resource constrained 
environment it is especially important to understand what works in 
terms of improving outcomes. A good example is the availability to 
researchers of data sources like the National Pupil Database which 




5 England has the best scores of the UK nations, and is just above average across 
PISA countries in science and reading, and below average in maths, see https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/pisa-2015-national-report-for-england
The first Growth Commission highlighted vital shortcomings in 
effective pre-school education in the UK. Children’s centres, 
introduced by the last Labour government’s Sure Start programme, 
are one way to do this and the Commission recommended that 
resources should be focused on the disadvantaged with an emphasis 
on evaluating best practice and propagating it throughout the system. 
Children’s centres have been successful at improving outcomes for 
disadvantaged children and parents, but budget cuts since 2010 have 
led many local authorities to close down or reduce children’s 
centres services. On the other hand it is encouraging that government 
has doubled the number of free childcare hours for 3 and 4 
year olds from 15 to 30 hours per week, and is providing additional 
support for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. This type of 
policy should not only allow more children to benefit from pre-school 
learning, but also support working mothers.
Our 2013 report highlighted worrying inadequacies in technical 
education and shortages in technical skills. The quality of vocational 
qualifications needs to be improved so that they represent a real 
alternative to university for school leavers, and add value for employers. 
The problems discussed in the 2011 Wolf report remain. There are 
still numerous vocational qualifications on offer, and the potential 
routes to be followed post-16 are much less well known than A-levels. 
Qualifications are awarded by many different bodies, and the quality 
of expected outcomes following vocational options is often unclear 
to school leavers, teachers and employers. 
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SME Finance Policies to increase competition in retail banking
Business Bank to prioritise young innovative firms
Long-termism Regulation and tax policy for long-termism
Industrial policy for key sectors
Management practices Targeted managerial training and support
O
th
er Inclusive Growth Publishing median income alongside GDP
 Good progress   Some progress   Little progress
The 2015 “Productivity Plan” set out policies to raise the prestige of 
vocational qualifications, and the 2016 “Post-16 Skills Plan” includes 
wide-ranging reforms that would simplify and improve the post-16 
system of vocational training, for example through the creation of a 
small number of full-time technical routes with a single awarding body. 
While this plan appears promising, it is necessary that reforms to the 
further education sector are aligned with the government’s industrial 
strategy. For example, the retail sector is notably absent and there is a 
strong case for government action to address obstacles to productivity 
growth in this low-pay, low-productivity sector (see Chapter 3). 
Another challenge for the further education sector is that planned 
reforms will not be met with additional funds: education spending 
for 16-19 year olds fell by 14% in real terms between 2010/11 and 
2014/15, and is protected only in nominal terms going forward.6 
The new Apprenticeship Levy is due to take effect in 2017, which is 
expected to raise £2.8 billion by 2020. 
6 See IFS (2015).
The UK has longstanding strengths in higher education which 
our first report suggested protecting and building on. It is essential that 
leading universities are able to recruit international talent (as faculty, 
research staff and students), and there were already signs in 2013 that 
this was becoming difficult for non-EU nationals. High quality students 
and researchers from abroad can not only contribute to the economy 
directly, but international students also increase resources available 
for domestic students.7 Government policy has gone backwards 
in this area. The visa system for non-EU nationals has not 
improved and there are new concerns around the status of EU 
students and academics following the Brexit vote. There are also 
new risks to the HE sector with respect to cross-border collaboration 
in research projects and their funding, a large portion of which has 
come from the EU. The Commission also suggested further improving 
the framework of rules and accountability in teaching and research.8
7 See Machin and Murphy (2014).
8 Stern Review (2016). 
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The funding of higher education has changed since our last report. 
In 2012 the coalition government raised the cap on tuition fees 
for undergraduate courses to £6,000 for all universities. But an 
allowance to charge £9,000, designed for use only in exceptional 
circumstances, is now being used by the vast majority of 
universities. The first Commission concluded that these changes 
would create a more stable funding environment allowing universities 
to make long-term investments in their facilities and programmes. 
However continued increases in the total costs of university 
education are likely to create a tension with opening up access to 
poorer families. Evidence suggests that the conversion of maintenance 
grants to loans (a more recent policy, which took effect from September 
2016) is likely to hurt applications from poorer students.9 
There have been positive developments too: new loans for postgraduate 
and MBA study were announced in the Productivity Plan, with the 
latter aiming to improve management practices in UK firms, which are 
a key determinant of productivity. In addition, the Higher Education 
and Research Bill is currently being pushed through Parliament, which 
announced the expansion of the sector with the aim of fostering 
growth and social mobility. In addition, an extra £2 billion annually 
was promised to the science budget in the Autumn Statement (from 
the new National Productivity Investment Fund, NPIF). This increase 
will take total (government and business) R&D spending as a share of 
GDP to 1.8% (from the current 1.7%).  This is a welcome increase, 
but leaves the UK spending a lower share of GDP on R&D than 
most other advanced economies. 
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is a vital component in sustainable growth. The first 
Growth Commission outlined persistent inadequacies in all areas of 
UK infrastructure and made a number of recommendations aimed 
at stimulating infrastructure investment. The core recommendations 
were to create a new institutional architecture: an independent body 
to guide strategic priorities, a commission to implement those priorities 
and an infrastructure bank to crowd in private sector investment. 
The aim of these suggestions was to eradicate short-termism, 
often politically driven, from long-term infrastructure decisions. 
9 See Dearden et al. (2014) and Dynarski (2003). 
There has been good progress in this area, with the establishment 
of an independent National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) 
which was announced in autumn 2015. In March 2016 the NIC 
published its first set of reports, setting out advice on Crossrail 2, 
Northern connectivity and smart power. In November and December 
2016 it also published further reports on growth in the Oxford-Milton 
Keynes-Cambridge corridor and 5G telecommunications connectivity. 
Its charter was published in 2016, and has come into force in January 
2017. The NIC is a positive development, and should tackle a number 
of problems set out in our first report, but its lack of statutory powers 
creates concern about its long-term independence. 
Britain has a longstanding shortage of housing supply, with house 
prices rising by 45% since 2005. Independent estimates indicate that 
around 250,000 new houses are needed each year in order to moderate 
house price inflation. The lack of affordable housing is a concern in 
terms of both productivity and inequality, preventing people from 
moving to high growth regions, and meaning that poorer families 
spend a large share of their income on mortgage payments or rent.
Progress has been much slower in other areas. An independent planning 
commission, charged with handling planning appeals and national 
applications (making decisions according to National Policy Statements) 
was in existence. However, in 2012, the coalition government brought 
its operations back into government as the “Planning Inspectorate”. 
Our first report discussed obstacles in obtaining local community 
consent for projects considered to generate an aggregate gain. There 
is a need for a more consultative process, involving communities early 
on, and designing creative mechanisms (over and above monetary 
compensation) in order to share the gains of development. There is an 
opportunity for the new NIC to work with the Planning Inspectorate 
in this area.
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Infrastructure finance is a longstanding problem in the UK. The 
first Commission developed a blueprint for a National Infrastructure 
Bank to facilitate the provision of finance for infrastructure projects, 
reduce and manage risk, and attract private sector investment. There 
are a number of international examples that show the potential benefits 
of such a bank (including Germany’s KfW, and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development). To date there has been no indication 
that government might set up an infrastructure bank. In part, this may 
be due to restrictions on government spending, or issues around how 
such a bank would be accounted for on national balance sheets. The 
current policy environment creates an opportunity here, both in terms 
of the loosening of the fiscal stance in recent months, and the fact 
that post-Brexit the UK will be able to formulate its own state aid rules 
rather than having to obtain approval from the European Commission 
for this kind of institution. 
There have been some efforts to raise funds for infrastructure projects. 
In autumn 2015 the government committed to sell state owned assets 
and reinvest the proceeds in infrastructure. There is also ongoing work to 
ensure that a portion of local authority pension funds capital – currently 
around £217 billion – is pooled and invested in infrastructure. Both of 
these policy developments are welcome, but will take time to materialise. 
In the 2016 Autumn Statement, the new NPIF was announced, a fund 
worth £23 billion to be used on infrastructure and R&D, and financed 
through additional government borrowing. Again this is a positive step, 
but infrastructure spending remains low by international standards and 
there is still a gap between spending and estimated infrastructure needs.10
Investment and innovation
Our 2013 report made a series of recommendations to improve the 
financing of investment, in particular addressing barriers for high growth 
potential SMEs in accessing finance. These included policies to increase 
competition in retail banking and a business bank that would 
prioritise young, innovative firms using a variety of financing tools.
10 McKinsey (2016).
The coalition government introduced a number of measures 
aimed at restructuring the retail banking market and stimulating 
investment, in particular, removing barriers to entry and separating 
retail and investment banking. There were also a number of policies 
to improve effective competition: a new seven-day current-account 
switching service was introduced in 2013 and a new project was launched 
to give customers standardised information to enable comparison of 
account services. The SME sector has been a particular focus, with a 
number of policies aimed at helping them raise finance measures to 
improve comparison of services, and to match SMEs that have been 
rejected for finance with other lending opportunities from challenger 
banks/alternative finance providers (for example, “Funding for Lending”). 
Despite these positive steps, the UK’s independent competition 
regulator recently concluded there are shortfalls in competition. 11
The British Business Bank, a publicly owned enterprise that provides 
credit and other forms of finance via private sector partners to SMEs, 
has expanded since our first report. By 2015-16 its total stock of finance 
(which includes funds directly deployed and funds that its participation 
has unlocked) reached £7.5 billion, up 45% on the previous year, and in 
the 2016 Autumn Statement, the Chancellor announced that it would 
receive additional funding. While this is a welcome development, it is 
important to note that the Business Bank represents a very small share 
of the total finance provided to the UK corporate sector.
Our first report identified financial short-termism as a longstanding 
problem in the UK and suggested regulatory or tax changes to promote 
a longer-term perspective. In particular, it proposed linking equity 
voting rights to investment duration to give long-term shareholders 
more power. The 2015 Productivity Plan highlighted the problems 
surrounding short-termism in business and financial markets but 
stated that government would leave it to institutional investors and 
businesses to push for more long-termism themselves, rather than 
introducing changes to corporate governance rules. 
Since taking office, the Prime Minister has discussed potential regulatory 
changes to corporate governance, such as worker involvement in setting 
executive pay. Government has also launched a Patient Capital Review, 
led by HM Treasury, to understand the barriers faced by innovative 
firms accessing long-term investment. 
11 CMA (2016).
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Our 2013 report advocated the development of a modern industrial 
strategy, supporting industries where the UK has comparative 
advantage and there exists growth potential. Progress on industrial 
strategy has reflected the pattern in Britain for the past 20 
years – government policy is often fragmented and lacking in 
coherence and continuity. The coalition government launched an 
“Industrial Strategy” which included support for eleven Key Sectors 
and eight Key Technologies. This strategy was not explicitly maintained 
following the 2015 general election, though elements of the work 
continued. The Prime Minister has indicated a commitment to this 
type of framework, and government has set out a Green Paper in 
January 2017. The CEP will respond formally to the Green Paper. In 
this report we provide a description of industry, across sectors and 
regions, and consider lessons from international case studies to make 
recommendations on a modern industrial policy for the UK. 
Inclusive growth policy
Growth is a precondition for economic wellbeing but does not 
guarantee it, particularly if the gains from growth are not shared. 
Our first report recommended publishing of median household income 
alongside the latest data on GDP in order to focus more attention on 
inclusive growth and distributional issues. Coverage on these issues 
in the UK is particularly weak, in part due to a lack of timely data. 
While our proposals have not been adopted, the lack of inclusiveness 
in the growth process has become increasingly salient in public debate: 
largely due to a realisation of the political implications of ignoring it. 
This topic has been explored in more detail in this report. 
The UK economy at the start of 2017
Like other advanced economies, the UK was hit hard by the 2008 
financial crisis. Since then, across the rich world, growth has been 
subdued. Relative to its main comparators, UK GDP growth has been 
strong (Figure 1.1). 






































Notes: Volume measure, 2008 Q2=100. Sources: INSEE, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
ONS, FRED.
The drivers of growth have varied across countries. In the UK, the 
principal growth driver has been employment. As Figure 1.2 
shows, the employment rate has held up, remaining above 70% since 
2008, and is now at 74.5%, an all-time high since comparable records 
began in 1971.
However, productivity growth has lagged far behind other 
countries. GDP per hour stands at 17% below its trend between 1980 
Q1 and 2008 Q2, and only just exceeds the level it was pre-crisis. This 
poor performance has been labelled the “Productivity Puzzle” because 
economists have been unable to fully account for it.12 
12 Barnett et al. (2014).
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Since our last report the simultaneous emergence of low growth, inflation 
and interest rates across many advanced economies has led many to 
argue that we are witnessing a permanent “Secular Stagnation”.13 
Others argue that this is temporary, relating to the cycle. It is likely that 
a combination of factors are at work. While the puzzle is international, 
on the whole our main peers have fared better since the financial crisis 
and therefore the longstanding gap in productivity levels has become 
ever wider: output per hour in the UK is now 35 percentage 
points lower than that in Germany and 30 percentage points 
below the US. 
High levels of employment and low levels of productivity are two sides 
of the same coin. It is arguably desirable for more people to be in work 
with a lower average productivity, compared to an alternative of high 
unemployment but higher productivity where less skilled workers are 
excluded from the workforce. The challenge for policy makers is to 
achieve productivity growth via innovation, investment, and upskilling 
the workforce, rather than through the composition of the labour force. 







































































Source: ONS, UK Employment rates (aged 16 to 64), seasonally adjusted.
13 Summers (2016).
Over the long run, there tends to be a relationship between productivity 
and pay. Reflecting poor productivity performance, wage growth 
in the UK has also been weak. The median worker’s pay is still 
around 5% lower than its pre-crisis peak. This corresponds to almost 
a 20% deficit relative to the trend in real wage growth from 1980 
to the early 2000s. Moreover, UK wages have fallen by more than in 
other OECD countries: with only Greece experiencing a larger fall in 
wages over the period 2007 to 2015. 
There are three other key concerns. First, the UK current account 
deficit is far larger than in any other advanced economy – and 
the largest in UK history. Second, the UK has a longstanding 
investment shortfall. Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP 
has been consistently lower in the UK than its main peers (Figure 1.3). 
The same is true for investment in R&D. Key factors that hold back 
business investment are policy uncertainty, short-termism in business 
and financial markets and associated problems accessing finance 
(especially for young, innovative firms). 
Primary school pupils take part in experiments  
at Imperial College London science lab.  
Thomas Angus/Imperial College London.
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Publicly financed R&D is an important source of UK innovation. 
Moreover, there is extensive evidence that this type of research 
“spills over” to the private sector, and leverages-in further private 
sector investment. The UK has comparative advantage in its 
university and research system, yet government financed R&D as 
a proportion of GDP is lower than in other advanced economies 
and this has been declining over time. Only recently did government 
commit additional funds to the science budget.
In an economy that specialises in services it is helpful to take a wider 
view of investment to include intangible assets (such as brands and 
organisational practices). Such assets are not measured in conventional 
output statistics. The UK generally does better in this area, and 
intangible investment has actually risen since the financial crisis. 
However, adjusting output to include intangibles appears to explain 
only a small amount of the productivity puzzle.14















































Notes: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % of GDP, series in constant prices, 
national base year. Source: OECD.
14 See for example Goodridge et al. (2015).
Finally, there are concerns that the supply of finance to the real 
economy is still impaired following the financial crisis: lending 
to business has been slower to recover than lending to households 
(Figure 1.4). Business surveys show that over 60% of SMEs use no 
external finance at all, and of those who do, bank finance (overdraft, 
loans and credit cards) is most common. Participants at our evidence 
sessions reported that other sources of finance that are more conducive 
to innovation where returns are longer term and uncertain (for example, 
private equity, crowdfunding or business angels) are less widespread in 
the UK compared to the US.
The referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU should be seen 
in light of these pre-existing challenges. Analysis from the CEP has 
shown that under different Brexit scenarios, trade and foreign direct 
investment (both of which are important for productivity growth) are 
likely to suffer.15 Moreover, given the skill shortages already faced by 
many firms in the UK, restricting the movement of labour from the EU is 
likely to have a negative impact on productivity – both directly through 
firms finding it harder to fill vacancies, but also indirectly through the 
impact on innovation if our innovative firms, universities and research 
labs are less able to attract and retain international talent. 
15 See Dhingra et al. (2016a, 2016b).
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Source: Bank of England.
The effect of low investment on both human and physical capital has 
been a slowdown in productivity and wages. While pay at the very 
bottom has been rising, median workers’ wages are lower in inflation-
adjusted terms than a decade ago. This pay stagnation has drawn 
attention to inequality which, while falling in recent years in the UK, is 
high by international standards. 
The immediate impact of the EU 
referendum
The first GDP releases from the ONS following the referendum show 
that the pattern of growth is broadly unchanged. GDP increased by 
0.6% in Q4 2016, the same rate of growth as the previous two quarters. 
This has been driven by a strong performance in the service sector. In 
addition, the domestically focused FTSE midcap index is above its pre-
referendum level.
The impact on the value of the pound has been greater. Immediately 
following the referendum result, the pound depreciated dramatically, 
and then declined further upon announcement of the timetable for 
Brexit negotiations. Today, the exchange rate is around 15% below its 
level before the referendum. Driven by the growing price of imports, 
inflation has risen to a two-year high.
The referendum result caused significant movements in other financial 
markets too. The price of UK banks’ shares dropped dramatically in the 
days after the referendum. At the same time their cost of funding, proxied 
by Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia, rose. Since then funding concerns 
have eased but the share prices of the UK’s two state-owned banks 
remain significantly below their pre-crisis levels.                                         .
Participants in our evidence session on Finance and the City of London 
suggested that Brexit was starting to have an impact. Venture capital 
fundraising dropped sharply in late 2016, with London falling behind 
New York for the first time on some measures. In line with this, the 
latest official forecasts suggest Brexit will have a significant impact. 
The OBR assumes Britain will leave the EU in 2019; due to lower trade, 
investment and immigration this will imply a 2.4 percentage point 
cumulative reduction to growth over the next five years and additional 
borrowing of nearly £60 billion. 
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Workers unpack suppliers’ goods at the ‘Inbound Receive’ area of Amazon’s distribution centre in Swansea, South Wales.
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2. Labour Markets and 
Inclusive Growth
The UK labour market has seen significant changes 
in recent years. A decade ago real wages were 
growing as pay increases outstripped price inflation. 
Following the 2008 crash, unemployment rose 
sharply and real wages fell significantly. Since 
then, the UK has experienced fast employment 
growth, but no growth of the typical worker’s 
pay. In fact, median real wages were lower in 
2016 than they were in 2006 – a lost decade. This 
chapter examines wage stagnation and tracks the 
important changes in the way the UK labour market 
works. The Growth Commission proposes a range 
of specific measures designed to diminish the risk 
that the UK gets stuck in a low wage, low-skill rut.
Productivity, pay and compensation
Productivity growth provides potential for the growth of living standards. 
As Figure 2.1 shows, it has followed two very different patterns over the 
past 35 years. Between 1980 and 2007 productivity (measured as output 
per worker, or output per hour) rose consistently year-on-year. The 2008 
crash saw a drop in productivity: this has lasted, surprising academic 
economists and professional forecasters alike. By 2016 Q3 productivity 
had only just recovered back to 2008 levels; it is around 17% below the 
level it would have achieved had the pre-crisis trend been maintained.
TABLE 2.1: KEY FACTS ON THE UK LABOUR MARKET, 2016





Average number of weekly hours 31.9
Average weekly wage (FT) £644
Median weekly wage (FT) £539
National Living Wage (weekly FT) £252
90th percentile (weekly FT) £1058
10th percentile (weekly FT) £309
Notes: All numbers apart from wages refer to September 2016, from ONS 
Labour Market Statistics, January 2017. Wages from Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings, April 2016. FT stands for full-time workers.












































OUTPUT PER HOUR, Y/H
Y/H 1980/2007 TREND
OUTPUT PER WORKER, Y/L
Y/L 1980/2007 TREND
Notes: Output per worker and output per hour numbers are provided by ONS, 
and indexed to 2007 Q3 = 100. Trend is calculated by fitting a linear trend 
between 1980 Q1 and 2007 Q3, the predictions are calculated out of sample 
for time periods after 2007 Q3.
Until recently productivity and workers’ pay have tended to move in 
tandem in the UK.1 This ended in 2008. Since then there has been nearly 
a decade of slowdown. For many workers, total compensation is higher 
than base pay, due to pensions, bonuses and other allowances like health 
insurance. Compensation represents the total cost to a firm of hiring a 
worker, and this has grown at almost the same rate as productivity in 
Britain since 1990 (Figure 2.2). Thus the labour share of income  has not 
fallen as much as in other countries.2
Wages have followed a different growth pattern to compensation and 
productivity (Figure 2.2).3 While the average (mean) and median wage 
did grow in real terms until 2008, they grew by less than productivity and 
compensation, and both have fallen considerably since then. This has 
created a gap between productivity and wage growth that economists 
refer to as “decoupling”.4 Decoupling intensified in the UK around the 
time of the financial crisis; it is evident that in terms of wages alone, the 
median worker has not shared equally in the gains from growth, and 
that this trend predates the downturn.
1 Castle and Hendry (2014).
2 See Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
3 Bukowski et al. (2017).
4 See Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013).
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Decoupling has been driven by a number of factors. Until 2008 median 
wages lagged productivity due to growing wage inequality and a widening 
wedge between wages and compensation. The average wage grew 
faster than the wage of the median worker. This pattern has changed 
dramatically since 2008 and real wages have fallen. At the same time the 
non-wage components of earnings – especially pensions – have become 
more important. And since these benefits are not available to the self-
employed whose numbers have increased, their position has deteriorated.














































































Notes: Growth rates of real productivity, real compensation (deflated by the 
GVA deflator), real average and median wages per hour (deflated by the CPI). 
Source: OECD National Accounts, ONS.
Wages and inflation
Between 2008 and 2014, and despite productivity having returned to close 
to its pre-crisis level, real wages in the UK fell by 8%, a drop unprecedented 
in modern history. Their slight recovery since 2014 (reducing the drop 
since 2008 to 5%) was due to the fall in price inflation.
























































Notes: Weekly earnings deflated by CPI, CPIH and RPIJ. Source: Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). 
These shifts in real wages are due to a change in the pattern of both 
pay and prices.  While between 2002 and 2008 average weekly 
earnings rose at an average of 4% a year and prices at just 2%, from 
July 2008 onwards the opposite occurred: pay growth fell to 2%, whilst 
inflation exceeded this.5 The increase in real wages since 2014 (Figure 
2.4) occurred because of a decrease in price inflation. However, this is 
unlikely to continue because of the inflation rise predicted after Brexit. 
5 There were two exceptions, March and April 2010, these two months show growth 
because of the large fall in the corresponding months of the previous year, which 
was driven by bonuses falling that year (Taylor et al., 2014).
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Since the result of the June 2016 referendum on EU membership real 
wages have been affected by rising inflation. Sterling has depreciated by 
15% against the dollar since the eve of the vote and according to the 
Bank of England’s most recent Inflation Report, the sterling depreciation 
will lead to higher import costs, raising consumer price inflation above 
target, hitting 2.7% in the next two years.6 Unless nominal wage rises 
offset this rise in prices, inflation associated with sterling depreciation 
threatens to undo recent improvements in real wage growth.








































CPI TO JUNE 2008 CPI FROM JULY 2008
3 MONTH NOMINAL AWE 3 MONTH CPI
MEAN AWE TO JUNE 2008 MEAN AWE FROM JULY 2008
Source: Average weekly Earnings (AWE) and CPI (three month averages) 
from ONS.
Placed in international context, UK real wage performance has 
been very poor. Since the financial crisis, real wages have fallen by 
more than in almost all other OECD countries. Figure 2.5 shows 
comparable average real wage growth data for 2007 to 2015 for 
28 countries. The UK’s relative performance is poor, placing it 27th, 
the only country below it being Greece.
6 Bank of England, Inflation Report, November 2016.



































































































































































































Notes: Average real wages defined by the ratio between total wage bill 
and average hours worked. Source: OECD Stats, 2016. 
The distribution of real wage changes in the UK
The decline in real wages in the UK since 2008 has varied considerably 
across different groups (Table 2.2). Men have seen larger falls in real wages 
(8%) than women (2%). Those at the top and in the middle (the 90th 
and 50th percentiles) have seen wages fall, while those on the lowest 
wages (the 10th percentile) have seen rises. This is consistent with the 
fact that wage inequality did not rise during the downturn, and has 
started to fall slightly in recent years. This contrasts with long-run wage 
inequality trends since 1980, which peaked at the start of the downturn.7
7 See, for examples, Machin (2011).
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Whilst the downturn experience of falling real wages for men has been 
worse than for women, the gap in hourly wages between men and 
women is currently 18%, a level which is greater than the OECD average. 
The overall gap has been falling in recent years, but it has risen for the 
most educated women. These patterns are not driven by innate gender 
differences in talent or preferences: when they enter the labour market, 
women in the UK have similar occupational patterns and pay as their 
male counterparts. Rather, the wage gap is explained by career breaks 
and a prevalence of part-time work among women with children who 
often return to work at a lower skill level.8 
Young people have suffered a considerable loss in their wages. Those 
aged 18 to 21 have seen a 16% fall in real weekly earnings (Figure 
2.7). A significant fraction of this change can be attributed to a fall in 
the number of those in full-time employment and in hours worked. In 
contrast, the hourly and weekly wages of those in full-time work only 
decreased by a small amount, at 1% and 3% respectively.
TABLE 2.2: CHANGES IN MEDIAN REAL WEEKLY WAGES BY 
GROUP SINCE 2008
Changes in Real Wages, 2008-2016
Weekly Hourly
Median -5% -4%
Male Median -8% -7%
Female Median -2% -1%
Age 18-21 Median -16% -1%
10th Percentile 1% 2%
90th Percentile -7% -6%
NMW Adult Rate 5%
Notes: Using CPI deflator. Updated CPI deflated numbers from Gregg et 
al. (2014b). Source: ASHE. 2016 figures are based on the Provisional ASHE 
estimates published by ONS in October.
8 See Bandiera and Valero (2016) for further discussion.
For those at the bottom,  the introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
by the Labour Government in 1999 and the Conservative introduction 
of the National Living Wage in April 2016 have helped drive pay up, 
resulting in those at the 10th percentile recovering at a considerably 
faster rate since 2014.9 As we shall see in the next section, however, the 
coincidental increase in self-employment takes these individuals outside 
the remit of minimum wage legislation.
The picture for those at the top is different: whilst these workers enjoy 
significantly higher pay (a worker at the 90th percentile is on gross 
earnings of around £1050 per week) their real-terms living standards 
are lower than a decade ago (Figure 2.6).











































Notes: NMW stands for National Minimum Wage and NLW stands for National 
Living Wage. Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) hourly 
earnings, all workers. 2008=100.
9 See Low Pay Commission (2016) and Bell and Machin (2016a).
A waitress places dishes on a tray carried by a 
robot couple at a restaurant in Jinhua, Zhejiang.
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Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) weekly earnings, all 
workers. 2008=100.
Self-Employment Earnings
The composition of the labour market has been affected by a substantial 
increase in self-employment and alternative working arrangements since 
the economic downturn, with an increase in both the proportions of 
self-employed individuals without employees as well as the share of 
workers employed under zero hour contracts. We can see from Figure 
2.8 that the self-employed have fared considerably worse than other 
workers with a drop by 2014/15 of close to 20% of their 2007/2008 
real weekly income. 






























































Notes: 2007/08=100. Source: Family Resources Survey (FRS). 
Employment, self-employment and the 
gig economy
At the same time as real wage growth has been weak, the unemployment 
and employment position has, at least at first glance, been far stronger. 
The trade-off between real wages and unemployment from 1980 to 2016 
is set out in Figure 2.9. In the most recent downturn, unemployment 
did not rise anywhere near as much as in the recessions of the early 
1980s and 1990s.
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Source: Median wages from ASHE, ILO unemployment rates from ONS.
The most recent experience was striking not just in its magnitude, but 
in the way the labour market reacted, resulting in a “high employment, 
low pay” cycle. However, other important compositional changes have 
occurred in the labour market at the same time, notably the rise in 
self-employment, more part-time workers wanting full-time work and 
insecure forms of employment. We focus on each of these in turn. 
Insecure Working Arrangements
Employment and unemployment rates alone do not fully explain the 
recent labour market adjustment. It is the shift in types of contract with 
reductions in hours and an increase in self-employment which partially 
helps explain the low unemployment rate. There is increasing concern 
that the UK’s strong labour market is coming at the expense of wages 
and that the “quality” of jobs on offer has declined with the rise of 
new insecure working arrangements in the so-called “gig economy”.
Since the Commission’s 2013 report insecure working arrangements, 
including zero hour contracts and short-term self-employment via one-
off jobs (“gigs”) have received a large amount of attention in the media, 
Parliament and, more recently, the courts. There is an ongoing debate 
as to whether these flexible new ways of working enhance workers’ 
options or simply reduce job stability, pay and legal rights. We expect 
these debates to be important in future policy discussions.
Part-time work, often involuntary, has become an important feature of 
the UK labour market (Figure 2.10). Since the start of the recession, the 
proportion of workers who are in part-time work has increased from 
26% to 28%. For some of these workers, including young parents, 
students and retirees, part-time employment is a voluntary choice. For 
many others it is not – a significant number of those workers in part-
time jobs want full-time jobs. As shown in Figure 2.10 the percentage 
of the workforce who were in part-time work but wanting full-time 
work doubled from 2.4% at the start of the recession to a peak of 
4.8% in 2013. So while unemployment did not reach the levels seen 
in previous recessions, the associated slack is still occurring through the 
“underemployment”of workers. With a ready supply of workers eager 
for more hours, the bargaining power of workers may have fallen, in 
part explaining lower pay growth.



















































































Source: QLFS, ONS. 
Zero Hour Contracts
Zero hour contracts are legal agreements in which the employer is not 
obliged to offer work; nor are workers obliged to accept any offer made. 
Prior to the introduction of Working Time Regulations and the National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998, zero hour contracts were used to maintain 
workers onsite during quiet periods while being able to avoid paying 
them as they were officially “off the clock”. While such practices have 
been banned and companies are legally required to pay workers the 
minimum wage for all onsite time (aside from breaks) zero hour contacts 
are still characterised for many as an insecure working arrangement. 
They are prevalent in other countries, including Australia and Canada.
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Figure 2.11 shows that between April 2012 and April 2016 the proportion 
of workers on zero hour contracts increased approximately six times. It 
has been suggested that part of the reason for the very quick increase in 
the figure from the onset of the recession was due to growing awareness 
from the media of the existence of such contracts and increased self-
reporting by individuals under this new employment status.10
10 For more information see ONS (2014b).
FIGURE 2.12: PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS ON NON 
GUARANTEED HOUR CONTRACTS
SURVEY OF BUSINESSES 
NOVEMBER 2015
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Source: ONS.
These kind of contracts appear most prominently in industries with lower 
wages, such as health and social work, and the accommodation and food 
services sectors (Figure 2.12). Figure 2.13 shows that the median zero 
hour wage rate for these workers is approximately 35% less than that for 
all workers. Furthermore, the median wage rate for zero hour contract 
workers has fallen in real terms by around 12.5% over the past five years 
while the median hourly rate for all workers has stayed relatively flat.
Deliveroo courier at Piccadilly Circus, London.
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Figure 2.14 shows that workers on zero hour contracts are more likely 
to say they want more hours (around 31% in comparison to 10% for all 
workers) and approximately 6 times the proportion of workers on zero 
hour contracts would like either a replacement job with longer hours or 
an additional job, in comparison to those not on a zero hour contract 
(12% compared to 2%).
FIGURE 2.13: MEDIAN REAL WAGES OF ZERO HOUR CONTRACT 





























































Notes: HR stands for hourly and ZH stands for zero hours. Source: QLFS, ONS.
FIGURE 2.14: DESIRE FOR HOURS BY CONTRACT TYPE
NOT ZH
ZH








Notes: ZH stands for zero hours. Source: QLFS, ONS. 
These insecure jobs do generate increased work experience for individuals 
and it is likely that some workers will prefer the flexible arrangement, 
particularly those whose wage is not their only source of income. However, 
recent evidence from the US has demonstrated that most workers do not 
value flexible scheduling.11 In particular estimates show that the average 
worker is willing to take a 20% pay cut in order to avoid a schedule 
set by an employer at short notice – exactly the circumstances that can 
arise when entered into a zero hour contract. Research into zero hour 
contracts is in a relatively early stage but if the UK is the same, then it 
would indicate that some workers are getting the worst of both worlds 
– lower wages as well as flexible working arrangements over which 
they have little control.
Firms and governments are turning against zero hour contracts. Firms 
such as Sports Direct (81% of whose staff were on zero hour contracts 
at one stage12), Curzon Cinemas and McDonalds have announced plans 
to phase out zero hour contracts or to offer their workers alternative 
arrangements, while New Zealand passed a ban outlawing zero hour 
contracts in 2016.
11 See Mas and Pallais (2016).
12 See Reynolds Porter Chamberlain (2016).
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Self-Employment and the “Gig Economy”
The “gig economy” – short-term self-employment – is growing in 
importance. It is estimated that 20-30% of the working age population 
in the US and EU-15 are engaged in “independent work” of this type.13 
Examples include the outsourcing of IT contracts to overseas experts; 
web developers and consultants receiving jobs through websites such 
as Upwork; transport services with taxi drivers and food delivery workers 
working for firms such as Uber and Deliveroo. There has also been a rise 
in more traditional “gig” work, in the form of temporary agency staff 
who operate on self-employment contracts.
While for some such working arrangements may be preferable, especially 
those performing more specialist skilled tasks where the pay rate is 
high (e.g. consultants and programmers), other workers whose main 
source of income is derived from such work would benefit from a more 
secure working arrangement. In addition self-employed workers are not 
afforded the same rights as employees. Examples include the right to 
be paid the National Living Wage, sick pay, holiday pay, employment 
security and pensions. The loss of valuable non-wage benefits such as 
pensions may help explain the large difference between wages and total 
compensation set out above.
































































PERCENTAGE SELF-EMPLOYED WITH EMPLOYEES
Notes: Gaps in series denote missing data. Source: QLFS, ONS.
13  See Manyika et al. (2012).
Despite the loss of rights and security, workers can be better off self-
employed, particularly in the short-term. First, the main National Insurance 
rate for self-employed workers is only 9%, in comparison to a rate of 
12% for employees (while gig economy “employers” avoid altogether 
the 13.8% National Insurance contribution paid by worker employers). 
It should be noted however that for those self-employed earning nearer 
the bottom of the distribution (between £5965 and £8060), there exists 
a National Insurance rate of £145 per annum. This tax does not have 
an employee equivalent and is a regressive feature of the self-employed 
tax setup. Second, the self-employed are eligible to claim certain costs 
as expenses which in turn reduces their tax liability. These include office, 
uniform and travel costs as well as costs of business premises. As a result 
a self-employed individual who has a home-office is able to claim a 
proportion of their residential housing costs as an expense, thus making 
it tax deductible.
Unsurprisingly, self-employment has been on the rise for years. The 
proportion of independent self-employed has been steadily increasing 
since the 1980s and since 2000 the proportion has increased from 9% 
to 13% of all workers (Figure 2.15). This rise has also gone hand in 
hand with a lack of earnings growth for the self-employed. Earnings 
have fallen sharply since 2008, and before then they were not rising to 
the same extent as employee earnings. Figure 2.16 shows that median 
earnings for the self-employed were 4% lower in 2014-15 than twenty 
years earlier in 1994-95. By contrast, full-time employees have seen a 
17% gain over this period. This suggests that a significant proportion of 
the increase in self-employment is due to lower income earners shifting 
from employee to self-employed status.
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FIGURE 2.16: MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS: EMPLOYEES AND 



















































































































Notes: 2015 prices. Source: Family Resources Survey, DWP. 
International evidence suggests that new flexible work arrangements 
are used by those at the top and bottom of the income distribution. 
A recent study in the US found that independent contractors were 
more likely to be prevalent in highly paying jobs; but that on-call 
workers (equivalent to zero hour contracts) were more likely to be 
employed in lower paying jobs.14 There is also evidence that the 
major concern for workers in the gig economy is how to manage 
highly variable income.15 This is more problematic for gig economy 
workers on low pay, whose ability to deal with expenditure shocks 
by building up a buffer stock of savings is likely to be limited. 
The early evidence on the gig economy is thus mixed – it appears 
that this is a “tale of two workers”. While some self-employed 
workers are likely to prefer a more flexible work arrangement, it 
is evident that in certain sectors workers feel they have diminished 
rights and poorer working conditions. There has been a surge in 
industrial action and cases being brought against firms who employ 
low-paying contractors.16 
14 See Katz and Krueger (2016).
15 See Upwork and Freelancers Union (2016).
16 Examples include Uber, Hermes, Deliveroo, Courier Cycles and Yodel.
In the longer term, the gig economy may erode employers’ incentives 
to invest in their workers’ skills. It is unlikely that short-term workers 
will receive extensive on-the-job training, and thus in the long run 
this may have an impact on the make-up of the skill set of the UK 
workforce. While it is too early to test this, the UK’s productivity gap 
suggests this is a risk that should be taken seriously, and one that can 
act to exacerbate already low levels of skills provisions for UK workers.
The UK’s regional labour markets
Wage growth over the past 20 years has differed greatly across the UK, 
with workers in London and the South East having consistently higher 
median weekly wages (See the maps in the Executive Summary). Another 
striking feature of the distribution of wages in the UK is the importance 
of cities. Outside London and the South East it is mainly metropolitan 
areas where workers earn above the national average. In smaller towns 
and rural areas, wages are consistently below this level. In geographic 
terms, wage growth in the UK has not been inclusive in recent decades.
Regional Pay and Productivity
The UK’s regional labour markets show interesting patterns of productivity 
and pay (Figure 2.17). In Scotland and the North East productivity 
continued to grow; these regions experienced relatively low wage falls. 
The most striking “decoupling” of pay and productivity was in London, 
the South East and Wales. In these regions productivity continued to rise 
but wages fell significantly below their 2005 inflation-adjusted levels.
In other places productivity has stagnated. In each region where this 
occurred – including Yorkshire and the Humber, the East of England 
and the North West – real wages also fell. These were also regions with 
the highest percentage of leave votes during the referendum on EU 
membership.17
17 See the empirical analysis on predictors of the Brexit vote in Langella and Manning 
(2016), and on real wages and trends in particular see Bell and Machin (2016b).
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Wage changes have contributed to varying regional patterns of inequality 
(Figure 2.18). In Scotland, the North East and the West Midlands the 
impact of the economic downturn has been spread more evenly across 
workers at all income levels. In other areas, where higher wages are more 
prevalent (including London, the South West and the East of England) 
those with higher pay have seen sharper falls. In these regions the 
median pay of highly paid workers (the 90th percentile) is still significantly 
below its 2008 inflation-adjusted level. Workers on lower pay have fared 
better, with wages driven up by the national minimum wages. In every 
region except London workers at the bottom of the distribution (the 
10th percentile) have seen their wages recover to above their pre-crisis 
levels in real terms.







































































It is widely recognised that Britain has a significant skills gap. Evidence 
of this is set out in detail in Chapter 3. In summary:
•  Higher education. The UK scores well on measures of graduate level 
education, but poorly on upper secondary and non-tertiary training, 
including vocational qualifications.
•  Skills shortages. The UK faces long-term skills shortages with businesses 
reporting concern about recruitment of high skilled employees (see 
e.g. Figure 3.5, Chapter 3): including the STEM subjects, languages, 
technical skills and basic numeracy and literacy.
•  Schools. Poor results in terms of adult literacy and numeracy at the 
bottom end of the education distribution compared to advanced 
economy peers, particularly for those growing up in disadvantaged 
backgrounds.
Britain does have programmes that seek to help reduce adult skill 
deficiencies, usually based on accreditation using the Qualifications and 
Credit Framework. They include the New Deal and Employment, Retention 
and Advancement (ERA) programmes. These programmes provide a 
broad range of services, including training and career advice, aimed at 
the activation of the unemployed and the improvement of employee-job 
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match. The focus is not only on jobseekers, but also on workers in low-
paid and part-time jobs. There has been a large amount of evaluation of 
the New Deal and ERA programmes, and while generally positive, it has 
focused mostly on employment outcomes. One evaluation of the ERA 
found positive effects on both reducing unemployment while increasing 
short-term earnings, though the earnings gains were specifically due to 
an increase in the proportion of participants who worked full-time.18 
While such gains are promising, they do not necessarily achieve the goal 
of skill upgrading to improve productivity and thus wages.
The shortcomings in the UK’s current skill development programmes are 
well-known.19 These include insufficient collaboration with employers 
in identifying crucial skills for the local labour market and failure to 
design relevant courses. Courses are too basic, general and only part-
time with low weekly hours. Furthermore, the overall amount spent by 
colleges and providers on learners in receipt of jobseekers allowance and 
employment support allowance in the UK is considerably lower than in 
other OECD countries. In 2011 spending on such programmes in the UK 
was approximately 0.02% of GDP, while the OECD average was 0.15%.
It has been argued that other countries’ policies on training and skill 
upgrading are better designed than those in the UK. For example, in 
Australia there is an emphasis on competition between training providers. 
Administrative data is used to produce a performance-based measure 
for providers of training, and better providers are able to win a greater 
share of training contracts. Other countries, including the US, also place 
a greater focus on incorporating employers into skill identification and 
course design.
In recent years government policy has sought to improve vocational 
training. For example, in the 2015 Summer Budget the Government 
announced the Apprenticeship Levy, a new policy designed to address 
increasing employee training outside the workplace. Entering into force 
in April 2017 the levy will require employers with more than a £3 million 
pay bill to pay a 0.5% levy of their total pay bill into a fund which will 
then be used for apprenticeships and training. Employers who have paid 
the levy will be able to access funding using a voucher system through 
a digital apprenticeship service account. While likely to have positive 
long-term gains this is likely to result in a short-term cost for large firms.
This, combined with the rise in the national living wage, which is set 
to rise to £9 (or 60% of median wages if lower) by 2020 has led some 
businesses to warn that these labour market policies might pose risks 
to corporate profitability, and employment.
18 See De Giorgi (2008), Riley and Young (2001), Blundell et al. (2004) and Hendra 
et al. (2011).
19 See Wolf (2011) and OECD (2014).
Corporate Profitability
At the same time as real wages have not grown, firms’ profits and cash 
holdings are currently close to or above an historic high over the past 
twenty years. Gross corporate profits have recovered since  the recession, 
and in 2015 were in fact approximately 3% higher than their 2008 
peak (Figure 2.19). Corporate cash holdings relative to GDP have been 
increasing for the past two decades. By the end of 2015 corporate cash 
holdings had risen to record levels, amounting to £587 billion. The return 
on capital has been rising steadily and shareholders have gained in the 
era of very low interest rates and lower corporate tax rates.




































































































REAL GROSS PROFITS CASH HOLDINGS/GDP
Source: National Balance Sheet, ONS.
Tax biases affecting the UK labour market
It is a core principle of good tax policy design that the system should 
be neutral and not bias one form of economic activity versus another.20 
The UK tax code exacerbates some of the problems set out above and 
has a number of biases.
The system incentivises self-employment. There are a number of tax-
based reasons why both firms and employees can gain by opting for 
self-employed status over contractual employee status. Workers have 
an incentive to become self-employed due to the reduction in National 
Insurance payments and ability to claim certain tax-deductible expenses. 
There is an even greater incentive for individuals to self-incorporate and 
20 See discussion in Mirrlees et al. (2011).
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pay themselves through a combination of a low basic salary (meeting 
basic NI contributions) and dividends (which do not face any such National 
Insurance taxation). In addition, firms gain by not having to pay National 
Insurance contributions of 13.8% to non-employee members of their 
workforce, as well as having no obligation to adhere to regulations 
including the National Living Wage, sick pay and holiday pay.
The current tax system also favours investment in physical capital, 
computers and machines, but offers few incentives for investment in 
human capital. In recent years the substitutability of workers with machines 
in the face of technological change and increased job automation has 
gained much coverage. The current tax system contains a number of 
relief schemes designed to create incentives for investment in capital:
•  Enhanced capital allowances. The UK tax code provides enhanced 
tax depreciation allowances against investment in certain types of 
capital. For example, “green” technologies generate a full tax write-
off. In general there are allowances for energy saving equipment, 
plant and machinery that is certified to be environmentally efficient 
and low emission vehicles.
•  Annual investment allowances. Companies can claim 100% of 
their first £200,000 of capital expenditure incurred.
•  R&D tax breaks. Expenditure on R&D by small and medium sized 
enterprises generate a tax deduction equal to 230%. Alternatively, SMEs 
can take a cash payment (£33.35 for every £100 of R&D expenditure) 
if the company is loss making, or has not yet started to trade. Large 
companies are given a tax credit of 11% of R&D expenditure, which 
similarly can be claimed as a cash payment if the firm is loss making.
•  The “patent box”. When a firm can prove that its profits are related 
to patents, a lower rate of tax applies: 11% in 2016/17, falling to 10% 
from April 1st 2017.
Whilst part of both R&D and patent investments may cover salaries of 
(high-wage) R&D workers, by comparison the tax incentives to invest in 
the human capital of the majority of workers are currently far smaller 
and often non-existent.21 Indeed, the UK has a long history of poor 
delivery of intermediate and basic skills, which both track back to the 
schooling and vocational education system. A widespread misalignment 
between skills provision and employers’ needs is a key feature of the 
issue of poor delivery.
21 See Costa, Datta and Machin (2017) for a descriptive factsheet on R&D tax credits 
and on human capital tax breaks that operate in other countries.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In many ways the UK labour market has outperformed other advanced 
economies in recent years: employment is at record highs and has had a 
progressive impact on labour market inequality. This is something that 
policy should seek to protect, since evidence suggests that unemployment 
can lead to medical problems, including depression, and exerts significant 
labour market scarring effects. While there is concern about the “quality” 
of some forms of employment, an economy at record employment 
highs is something to build on.
But there remains the problem of weak wage growth, with median 
workers losing at least a decade, and real wage falls the worst in Europe 
with the exception of Greece. Meanwhile the UK, relative to its rich 
world peers, is also falling further behind in terms of skills. Moreover, 
whilst low-wage workers have been doing better in terms of wage 
growth than their counterparts further up the wage distribution, the 
likelihood of being stuck in a zero hour contract or minimum wage job 
with  less prospect of career progression than in the past has increased. 
Therefore policy needs to be aimed towards improving skills, facilitating 
career progression and boosting wages.
The Commission proposes:
Aspriring to a tax and minimum  wage  system that  is  neutral 
with regard to forms of employment. The government should 
eliminate advantages to firms and employees using the self-employment 
classification to avoid payroll taxes and minimum wage legislation. 
Attention to classification of employed versus self-employed is especially 
important for low-wage workers who are losing entitlements to minimum 
wages and other employee benefits as a result. 
Lifelong learning and adaptable skills. Continuous skill development 
can help workers gain greater security and adaptability in a world of 
rapidly changing technologies and labour market structures. Improving 
both the education and training system, and the ability of individuals 
and firms to finance this are crucial.
A new system of tax breaks for skills investment. Tax breaks and 
allowances for capital should be extended to skills investment. This should 
place investment in staff training, courses and education on the same 
footing as investment in plant and machinery. This could take the form 
of a Skills and Training tax credit which is similar in spirit to the existing 
R&D tax credit. The policy would need to be carefully designed to ensure 
additionality and that money was spent on high quality skills provision 
that adds to employability, career progression prospects, and to worker 
productivity. Such a skills development and training strategy requires 
close interaction between employers and well-resourced technical/adult 
education colleges.
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Production operator soldering circuit boards at Axiom Manufacturing, Newbridge Gwent, South Wales.
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3. Industrial Strategy
Britain’s extended period of poor productivity 
growth has revived interest in developing a 
more active industrial strategy. This chapter 
outlines some of the market failures which justify 
a new approach in the UK, highlighting the 
challenges in its design. We begin by outlining 
the principles and priorities. We then set that in 
the context of the landscape and performance of 
UK firms. We review lessons from the experience 
of the UK and other contexts. Based on this 
analysis the Commission recommends a new 
industrial strategy framework, including a new 
legal footing, the introduction of independent 
decision-making or oversight, and steps to 
enhance transparency and analysis of the 
industrial interventions that are needed and 
are made in the UK.
The need for an industrial strategy
The term “industrial strategy” has a chequered history often associated 
with a desire to steer the economy from the centre, subverting the 
dynamic forces of creative destruction which power modern capitalist 
economies.  But every government has an industrial strategy however 
it chooses to articulate it: the government influences the investment 
climate for business, establishes national priorities, chooses tax and 
regulatory structures, invests in skills, infrastructure and research and 
procures outputs from the private sector, all of which influence the 
evolution of the private economy.  What varies through history is 
how far governments have been willing to spell out their strategy and 
the arguments which underpin it.  The aim of this chapter is to offer 
a blueprint for a modern industrial strategy informed by extensive 
evidence on the structure of UK business and experience with such 
policy both in the UK and other countries.  
One key policy priority is to improve UK productivity which lags behind 
its international peers. This longstanding gap has been exacerbated by 
the weak productivity performance since the financial crisis. According 
to the latest data, UK output per hour is 35 percentage points lower 
than in Germany (Figure 3.1). This gap is explained by weaker 
productivity across all industrial sectors, rather than by differences in 
the sectoral composition of the economy. Every sector in the UK has 
a large number of unproductive firms, and a similar pattern exists 
for businesses in different size bands. Productivity growth is crucial 
for sustainable growth in living standards, and addressing this gap is 
therefore the central challenge for industrial strategy design. 




















Notes: ONS, 2015, Current price GDP per hour worked. UK=100. G7 
average=118.
Since the first Growth Commission there have been a number of 
policies aimed at raising productivity. Most recently, the UK government 
released a Green Paper including a number of proposals on Industrial 
Strategy. The challenge to government is to set out a long-term, 
overarching strategy to raise business performance in the UK. These 
industry-focused policies form part of a wider growth strategy that 
uses economy-wide policies which apply to all UK firms.1
Here, we argue that more selective policies targeted towards specific 
sectors and firms must be underpinned by transparent reasoning as 
well as a new institutional framework. Attempting to “pick winners”, 
as the experience of the 1970s showed, often resulted in subsidising 
losers. The framework in place while the UK has been part of the EU 
has heavily circumscribed the potential for the use of such policies. 
Hence Brexit opens up some policy opportunities. And whether the 
UK makes heavy use of selective industrial policy or not, there 
will be a need for a guiding framework to replace the EU State 
Aid regime.
1 Policies which focus on individual industries or regions are sometimes referred to 
as “vertical” industrial policies. By contrast economy-wide policies are sometimes 
referred to as “horizontal”. 
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Improving productivity is not the only policy priority. The government’s 
aim to create an economy that works for everyone emphasises the 
need for growth which is equitable and regionally balanced. Sustainable 
growth also requires an appreciation of the environmental impact of 
economic activity. The government’s legally binding climate change 
targets should play a key role in shaping industrial strategy. The 
dynamics of cities and successful agglomeration of economic activity 
through urban regeneration is also central, requiring an institutional 
framework which achieves the right balance between local initiative 
and national coordination.
To date, UK industrial policy has fallen short of these goals. It is 
fragmented, with teams in different government departments often 
working separately. Regular re-branding or changing of business 
policies and departments, a long-standing problem in the UK policy 
environment, creates uncertainty for investors. The system of local 
governance is fragmented with a lack of spending power and autonomy 
over relevant policy-levers.
Principles of Industrial Strategy
Government policies should be based on an understanding of 
why free markets may not deliver the most effective outcomes. 
The role of government is to assess the wider societal benefits from 
economic activity and this, above all, should guide industrial strategy. 
For example, green technologies, healthcare technologies, or regional 
policies that improve local standards of living may not be taken into 
account by firms when making their investment decisions in isolation.2
Government can also promote the diffusion of information, acting as 
a co-ordinator, for industry, researchers, regulators and investors who 
might not otherwise come together. It can also share risk, providing 
funding for high growth-potential firms that would find it difficult to 
access market finance. Via funding of R&D it can address the well-
known failure that markets do not internalise the positive externalities 
from research and under-invest.
In some sectors or places, adoption of existing technology or 
practices can be more important for raising productivity than 
new innovation. Government can address obstacles that prevent 
firms investing, such as information frictions or high set-up costs. The 
market process works best when there is exit of unsuccessful firms 
along with entry of new firms and growth of successful firms. The latter 
requires a financial system which is effective at channelling support to 
high-quality firms. Pro-active efforts to promote best practice along 
with facilitating entry and exit is needed to move core sectors of the 
2 This can create spatial externalities. In markets where size matters, there may be 
gains from policy interventions that facilitate the expansion of an agglomeration 
or, indeed, the establishment of a successful cluster.












































Notes: General expenditure on R&D (GERD) (includes both business and 
government funded activity) as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD MSTI.
economy such as construction, retailing and personal services towards 
the global frontier in terms of performance. These sectors are important 
in UK employment and raising their productivity and wages will 
therefore have large benefits for the UK economy. Industrial strategy 
should not be focussed on high-tech sectors alone. 
It is vital that competitive processes influence decisions about industrial 
strategy. EU State Aid rules have tied ministers’ hands in a helpful 
way, effectively protecting them from pressures to intervene 
and limiting the subsidisation of uncompetitive sectors. Post 
Brexit, it will be necessary to have equivalent laws in the UK. One of 
the greatest dangers of activist industrial policy is favouring specific 
firms within a sector and compromising benefits from competition. 
Successful sectors of the economy are frequently characterised by open 
entry and exit by failing firms to ensure that only the most successful 
businesses survive.
Investment
The UK has poor infrastructure compared to its international peers 
and large-scale investments are required in all areas. In recent decades 
Britain has found it hard to make informed decisions on infrastructure 
needs, hard to stick to them, and harder still to implement them due 
to problems accessing finance and/or planning permissions. The lack of 
a coherent, long-term infrastructure strategy and the associated policy 
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risk has also led to a high cost of capital and difficulty raising finance 
from the private sector. The government has made some progress in this 
area in recent years, with the establishment of the National Infrastructure 
Commission – an independent institution that should help to reduce 
policy uncertainty and also be the hub of rigorous analysis to establish the 
UK’s infrastructure needs. There have also been moves to channel more 
public-sector investment into infrastructure, such as the pooling of local 
authority pension funds and the new National Productivity Investment 
Fund. These developments are welcome but there is still much to be 
done. The policy climate in many areas is still uncertain and a deterrent 
to long-term private investment. And there is, as yet, no clearly articulated 
strategy which joins up housing, transport and energy needs. 
The UK’s housing supply crisis is longstanding and well-known: we do 
not cover it in detail in this report. Acute housing shortages in some 
areas and rising prices (in London in particular) distort incentives to 
invest in other types of assets and restrict labour market flexibility. 
This is holding back productivity growth and harming the quality of life 
in the UK. It has major implications for the intergenerational distribution 
of income as housing assets are increasingly held by older age groups. 
Improving the supply of affordable, environmentally sustainable, high 
quality housing should be a central plank of government policy. The 
root cause of the housing crisis is government policy. Given the failure 
of the local planning system to deliver over decades, progress can only 
be achieved with a properly articulated and executed plan by central 
government. This should be central in any industrial strategy which 
mobilises the resources for housing investment.
A range of sectors need to innovate to stay on the global technology 
frontier. The standard measure of innovation input is Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditure. Government and business R&D are 
consistently lower than our main peers as a share of GDP (Figure 
3.2). Publicly financed R&D is an important source of UK innovation, 
and it is also important since there is extensive evidence that this type 
of research “spills over” to the private sector, and stimulates further 
private sector investment.3 
While the UK excels in terms of the quality and impact of its 
research, it is worse than other countries at commercialising ideas.4 
A standard measure of innovation output is patents and the UK is below 
the OECD average in patents per person.5 There are also well-documented 
problems with collaboration between business and Universities.6 
3 See Moretti et al. (2014), Haskel and Wallis (2013), Goodridge et al. (2015), 
Hausman (2012) and Kantor and Whalley (2014).
4 See for example BIS (2014) or Elsevier (2013).
5 The UK came 15th among OECD countries in terms of its Triadic patent families 
(corresponding patents filed at the EPO, USPTO and JPO for the same invention, by 
the same applicant or inventor) per million inhabitants in 2013, see OECD (2016).
6 See the Dowling Review (2015). 
The UK does better in its investment in intangible assets, for 
example new business practices and software. These types of asset 
are particularly important in an economy like the UK which is service-
dominated. Total intangible investment has been increasing over time 
and it has been greater than tangible investment since the early 2000s.7 
Moreover, the UK does well compared to other advanced economies, 
investing more on intangibles as a share of GDP than France and 
Germany, though less than the US (Figure 3.3).


















Source: Corrado et al. (2012), OECD.
7 See Goodridge et al. (2016).
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Investment in fixed capital has been consistently low as a share 
of GDP in the UK. Moreover, business investment collapsed after the 
financial crisis and only recently recovered. Key factors contributing to 
this have been policy uncertainty, short-termism in financial markets and 
associated problems accessing finance (especially for young, innovative 
firms seeking bank loans, or medium sized firms requiring scale-up 
equity investment). While these are persistent issues in the UK, there are 
concerns that the supply of finance to the real economy is still impaired 
following the financial crisis. Chapter 5 discusses these problems in detail. 
Skills and management practices
Improving skills is critical for growth. Skills are not only important for 
productivity in their own right, but also through knowledge spillovers 
that can contribute to the success of business clusters.8 The UK has 
improved its performance in higher education, and the share of adults 
with a university degree has increased steadily in recent years. Moreover, 
there has been a rise in the graduate share in all regions of the UK. The 
UK has a higher graduate share than France, Germany and the OECD 
average, but lower than the US (Figure 3.4). Other European countries, 
Germany in particular, have a much higher share of upper/secondary 
non-tertiary graduates which includes vocational qualifications: an area 
where the UK underperforms both in terms of quality and quantity.
8 See for example Gennaioli et al. (2013) and Moretti (2004). 











































Notes: Educational attainment, by level, in percentage of adult population 2015. 
Source: OECD.
Despite the increases in graduates, the UK faces long-term 
productivity-harming skills shortages. Skills shortages are reported 
in all regions of the UK and the issue has worsened over time. In 2015, over 
20% of job vacancies were due to skills shortages in all regions (compared to 
around 15% in 2011). Similarly, skills shortages are reported by employers 
in all sectors, and have increased in many sectors in recent years (Figure 
3.5). Business surveys show that a majority of firms have concerns in this 
area.9 While shortages in STEM subjects are widely discussed, there are also 
issues in other disciplines (for example languages), technical or vocational 
skills, and even in terms of basic (numeracy and literacy) and “soft” skills. 
School performance in the UK is poor by advanced-economy 
standards. The outcomes for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds are 
a key driver of this: children on free school meals or in poorer postcodes 
do worse than their peers from wealthier families. The UK’s position in the 
OECD’s Programme for International Assessment (PISA, which compares 
student performance at 15) is in the middle of the range of scores for 
participating countries. In the latest assessments, the UK continues to be 
average or below average in mathematics, reading and science. Scores 
are similar in all constituent countries of the UK. Moreover, there has been 
little change over recent years, despite large-scale reforms to the school 
system, and government explicitly targeting improvements in PISA scores. 
9 For example, the CBI education and skills surveys also consistently report skills 
shortages. In the latest survey, 69% of businesses are not confident they will be 
able to recruit sufficient high skilled employees in the future. 
Bristol Robotics Laboratory is the leading and largest 
academic centre for multi-disciplinary robotics research in 
the UK. University of the West of England (UWE Bristol)
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This poor performance of UK school leavers, coupled with an inadequate 
further education sector contributes to a large fraction of jobs being 
low-skill and low-pay. At the same time, the UK does not fare well in 
terms of the lower end of the basic skills distribution among adults. 
In the OECD’s 2012 international survey of adult skills in 24 countries 
(the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies, 
PIAAC), the nations of the UK have a sizable number of individuals with 
poor literacy and numeracy skills.10 Moreover, when younger people 
are compared with older people, there is scant evidence of progress, 
unlike in the majority of other PIAAC countries where younger people 
have superior levels of literacy and numeracy. The UK is clearly losing, 
and dropping further back, in the international race in basic skills. The 
position is reasonably good at the top end of the basic skills distribution, 
but dire at the bottom.
Female talent is misallocated in the UK. Gender gaps in participation and 
wages are high compared to other OECD countries, largely explained 
by career breaks and part-time work after women have children. Other 
countries have introduced policies (for example, Sweden’s “daddy 
months”) that encourage parents to share work and home responsibilities. 
Studies suggest large productivity gains would be possible from tackling 
skill misallocation, and point to wider societal gains from policies that 
encourage parents to share home and work responsibilities.11 



























































































































































Notes: Skills shortage vacancies as a percentage of total vacancies by sector. 
Source: Employer Skills Survey (2015).
10 See http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/
11 See Bandiera and Valero (2016).
Management practices matter for productivity and UK firms on 
average are worse managed than those in the US and Germany.12 
A key driver of this is the poor management practices in smaller, family 
run firms, who tend to use primogeniture to choose their CEO.13 This 
is encouraged by UK tax laws on the inheritance of business assets. 
Managers of family firms tend to lack information on best practice. It 
has also been found that firms with more skilled workers are better 
managed. This “complementarity” between management practices 
and skills may be another avenue through which improvements in 
human capital can raise productivity over and above the direct impact 
on a worker’s own efficiency. 
Industrial civil society 
Britain’s industrial civil society is weaker than our peers’. The community 
of business leaders could benefit by deepening their collaboration and 
sharing of expertise to develop a stronger industrial “civil society”. 
Lessons can be learned in this respect from “coordinated market 
economies” such as Germany.14 In 2010, the coalition government 
set up 39 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). These are voluntary 
partnerships between local authorities and businesses, and replaced the 
9 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) that existed before. However, 
LEPs have much smaller budgets than RDAs impairing their ability to 
hire experienced staff, organise events and invest in local civil society. 
British Industry: a bird’s-eye view 
It is relatively easy to set up a company in Britain, taking just 
five days. The UK leads the US in terms of ease of doing business 
ranking 7th overall while the US ranks 8th. The “enterprise birth rate” 
(new firms as a percentage of total active firms) was 14% in 2014, 
putting the UK 5th of the 28 members of the EU less Greece (Figure 
3.6). This has increased from 10% in 2010. 
12 Bloom et al. (2016).
13 See Bloom et al. (2014) and ONS (2017a).
14 Hall and Soskice (2001).
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Notes: Number of newly born enterprises as a % of the total number of active 
enterprises. Source: Eurostat.
Start-ups are mainly in the services sector (which represented 96% of 
the newly created enterprises from 2010 to 2015). While most regions 
are quite similar, a large share (39%) of start-ups are in London and 
the South East, with relatively low numbers of new firms set up in 
Northern Ireland (Figure 3.7). It does not appear that barriers to starting 
up firms are at the heart of the UK’s productivity shortfall.
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Notes: Birth rates by region, 2010-2015. Source: ONS.
The dominance of small firms
The size distribution of UK firms is illuminating. In the most recent 
data for 2016, there were 5.5m businesses in the UK.15 They fall 
under three main legal categories: sole traders, ordinary partnerships 
and actively trading companies. By far the most common were the 
3.3m sole traders.16 There were 1.8m actively trading companies and 
421,000 ordinary partnerships.
Small firms dominate the British business landscape. Across the 
UK 96% of businesses are classed as “micro” sized (having under 10 
employees) (Figure 3.8). The vast majority of these (80%) actually 
have no employees other than the self-employed owner-manager, or 
an owner-director. This type of business accounts for nearly a third of 
private sector employment and 20% of sales.
15 BIS (2016b). 
16 Sole trader status means there is no legal divide between the business and the 
individual running it. Importantly, this means that the businesses debts are legally 
regarded as the debts of the individual. Partnerships are another arrangement 
where there is no separation between the individual and the firm. In a limited 
trading company here the company is a separate legal entity from its owners, and 
is responsible for its own debts.
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Notes: Private sector businesses only. Source: BIS, 2016.
Small firms are dominant across sectors – with the median firm in all 
sectors having under 5 employees (Figure 3.9).


























































































































































Notes: 10th and 90th percentiles are ends of thin error bars, 25th and 75th 
are end points of thick bars. Source: ONS.
There is a conspicuous gap in the middle. Small businesses that 
employ between 10 and 49 people account for 4% of firms, and 
15% of employment. But mid-sized firms represent less than 1% 
of firms and only 12% of employment. The dearth of mid-sized 
businesses has long been a concern, with much discussion about the 
success of Germany’s “Mittelstand”, the specialist and export oriented 
medium sized companies that have contributed to Germany’s strong 
performance since the financial crisis. While 99% of German firms are 
small or medium sized – a similar headline figure to the UK – micro-
enterprises represent a smaller share of employment (20%), and small 
and medium sized firms (which include the Mittlestand) employ over 
40% of the workforce.
Large businesses on the other hand represent a tiny fraction of total 
UK firms, but employ 10.4m people (40% of all employment) with 
around 1,450 workers per firm on average. These firms accounted 
for 53% of turnover in 2015.
While the total number of businesses in the UK has risen by 
59% since 2000, 90% of this increase can be explained by non-
employing businesses which have seen the fastest growth of all 
categories (Figure 3.9). The number of large businesses actually fell 
after 2002 and only started to recover more recently. Micro and small 
businesses tend to dominate all sectors in terms of firm numbers but 
are even more common in sectors such as agriculture, education, 
construction, and “other services”. Large firms are more common in 
finance, mining and utilities, retail and administration.
Tormore distillery workers moving barrels to aging store. 
Whiskey remains one of the UK’s most successful exports, 
worth almost £4billion per year.
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Notes: 2000=100. Source: BIS (2016b).
The dominance of small firms has implications for productivity and 
pay. On average large firms are more productive and are more likely 
to export goods. After controlling for size they pay higher wages and 
more taxes than their smaller counterparts. There are a number of 
reasons for this: small businesses are not able to take advantage of 
economies of scale, are more likely to face constraints on investment 
due to problems accessing finance, offer less scope for specialisation, 
and tend to have weaker organisational practices and technologies. 
A particular problem holding back high growth potential start-ups 
in the UK has been a lack of scale-up capital, a problem explored in 
Chapter 5. In addition, policy distortions can prevent small companies 
scaling up where it would be more efficient for them to do so. For 
example, there is a plethora of government schemes targeted at SMEs. 
The rationale for such schemes is often unclear. Because SMEs have 
lower productivity and pay lower wages, a concern is that firms have 
incentives to stay small to take advantage of these subsidies and this 
could depress aggregate productivity. Similar incentives are created 
by the tax code and regulatory structures.17 18 
Another phenomenon since the financial crisis which might have 
contributed to poor aggregate productivity growth has been the lack 
of poorly performing businesses shutting down. The company “death 
rate” has fallen from 12% in 2009 to 9% in 2015, in spite of the fact 
17 See, for example, Garicano et al. (2012).
18 Mirrlees et al. (2011). 
that the number of loss making firms rose from around 22% to 35% 
between 1997 and 2011.19 This has been attributed to an extended 
period of low interest rates and the reluctance of banks to write off 
loans for poorly performing companies, granting them instead interest 
payment holidays (a phenomenon known as “forbearance”). It was 
estimated that this applied to around 6% of SMEs in 2013.20 Most 
analyses find that this has had only a moderate impact on productivity 
growth since 2008.
A Sectoral Perspective
The services sector has become increasingly central to the British 
economy, representing around 77% of firms, and over 80% 
of employment and value added (Figure 3.11). There is a similar 
pattern of services sector dominance in other advanced economies 
though manufacturing takes a larger share of output in Germany, and 
the public sector (non-market services) is larger in France. 
FIGURE 3.11: NUMBER OF BUSINESSES, EMPLOYMENT AND 


































Notes: GVA stands for Gross Value Added. Source: ONS.
19 Barnett et al. (2014).
20 Arrowsmith et al. (2013).
41
In order to compare the relative productivity level in different sectors, 
we calculate gross value added (GVA) per worker. The most productive 
sectors also tend to have a smaller employment share (Figure 3.12). 
Real estate is an outlier because GVA in this industry mostly reflects 
imputed housing rents rather than the sales of firms. But electricity 
and gas, finance and IT which have high output per worker, each 
represent under 4% of the workforce. In contrast, wholesale and retail 
trade stands out as having low measured productivity but employing 
nearly 16% of the workforce. Other market economy sectors with 
particularly low productivity include hotels and food, administrative 
services, agriculture and arts.
While there are differences across sectors in terms of average 
productivity, there is a “long-tail” of unproductive firms in all industry 
groups and firm size bands. Two-thirds of workers are employed 
in businesses where productivity is below average for their size 
and sector, significantly more than in Germany. This suggests 
economy-wide policies are vital in tackling the UK’s productivity 
challenge.





















































































































































































































Notes: GVA/employment relative to average=100. Source: ONS.
Moreover, differences in sectoral productivity are reflected in differences 
in pay: high productivity sectors tend to pay more to the average 
worker and vice versa. Broadly, the sectors that have the largest share 
of UK profits, also record the highest share of total wage bill. Shares 
of profit and pay are closely aligned for manufacturing and retail, 
but profits far exceed pay in finance, professional services and IT. By 
their nature, non-market services record little or no profit, but take 
a large share of pay.
In the years before the financial crisis UK productivity growth was 
strong – averaging around 2.6% per annum in the market economy.21 
Professional and administrative services, IT and finance explained 
over half of the growth in this period. Since then while productivity 
growth has been close to zero, one of the only sectors to hold up 
in its contribution has been professional services (Figure 3.13). The 
largest reductions have been in the contribution of manufacturing 
and finance to productivity. In the case of manufacturing this has 
been due to a fall in productivity and a fall in the share of output. In 
the case of finance, productivity has fallen, but the sector has actually 
grown in terms of its share of market economy GVA.
21 Corry et al. (2011).
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Notes: Average annual growth rate of GVA per worker by sector, weighted by 
its average share in GVA. Market economy only. Source: EU KLEMS.
This analysis reveals that while services dominate the UK economy, 
the services sector itself has a mixed performance. It contains high-
performance, high-growth sectors such as finance, business services 
and IT, but also low productivity sectors that tend to employ a larger 
share of the workforce. An effective industrial strategy will have 
different policy prescriptions for these sectors.
In terms of the UK’s “revealed comparative advantage” (RCA), 
finance, insurance and other business services consistently stand 
out as strengths. The UK also possesses comparative advantage in 
some areas of manufacturing: those most commonly highlighted 
include aerospace and pharmaceuticals. In high growth-potential 
and innovative sectors, the principle for intervention should be to 
address market failures that prevent growth. This varies by sector, or 
even within sector, by location (for example skills shortages). This was 
the thinking behind the coalition’s industrial strategy that identified 
sectors and technologies where the UK has strengths and created 
various frameworks to support them. 
Other sectors present different challenges. In the market economy, 
retail and wholesale trade, hotels and food, and administrative services 
all have low average productivity and pay, and account for over 30% 
of total employment. Raising productivity in low-productivity 
low-pay sectors could have large aggregate effects and also 
help to reduce wage inequality. It has been estimated that if the 
productivity of these sectors were raised to match levels in France, 
Germany and other European countries, the UK could close a third of 
its aggregate productivity gap with those countries. 22
Problems in these sectors include inadequate adoption of existing 
technologies and a low skill base relative to other sectors and the 
same sectors in other countries. The relatively poor performance of 
school leavers, coupled with weak further education contribute to 
low productivity here. Low labour costs might have contributed to 
a lack of investment in productivity-enhancing technologies or staff 
training, and the introduction of the new “national living wage” 
might change this. 
An industrial strategy for these sectors must therefore overcome the 
specific barriers to investment in both existing technologies and people. 
Enhanced technical education is needed, and this highlights the overlap 
between industrial strategy and skills policy. In the government’s current 
Post-16 Skills Plan, the retail sector is notably absent.
A Regional Perspective
Economic activity in the UK is skewed towards London and the South 
East. These areas account for nearly 40% of total GVA and 33% of 
firms, but just 27% of the population. London is the densest area, 
with 1,464 businesses per 10,000 people, compared to just 679 in 
the North East.23 London and the South East are the most productive 
regions and also have the highest employment shares. The North 
West has low average productivity despite being the third largest 
employer (Figure 3.14).
22 Spencer et al. (2016).
23 BIS Business Population Estimate (2016).
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Notes: GVA/employment relative to average=100. Excludes the mining sector 
(1% GVA) as Extra Regio activity is not apportioned across regions. Source: 
ONS Regional Gross Value Added (Income Approach) and Business Register 
and Employment Survey. 
Recent analysis from the ONS suggests that differences in productivity 
between regions are not driven by differences in industry composition, 
but are explained by firms being less productive across regions even 
within the same sector.24 For example, firms in London have higher 
median levels of productivity in most industry sectors when compared 
with other regions. 
There is considerable variation in regional innovation within the UK 
(Figure 3.15). The highest share of R&D expenditure takes place in the 
East of England, London and the South East.25  Investigating patterns 
of regional innovation in depth, the government’s recent Science and 
Innovation Audits have shown that there are many strong clusters of 
research and innovation across the UK. These include transport, medical 
food and energy in the Midlands, advanced engineering in South West 
England and South Wales, and advanced manufacturing in Sheffield. 
24 ONS (2017b).
25 This represents a much larger share of regional GDP in the East. The share of 
GDP devoted to R&D has actually fallen substantially in the East since the financial 
crisis, which has also occurred in the North.
Regional imbalances have grown much faster in the UK than 
in other major European countries. The increase in regional GDP 
disparities is much higher than in France, Germany, Spain and Italy, 
and also (at state level) than in the USA.26 The underlying causes of 
these disparities are differences in the distribution of growth drivers 
including innovation, infrastructure and education, set out previously.
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Notes: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP. Source: Eurostat.
A programme of decentralisation to city regions, including the “Northern 
Powerhouse” has sought to address regional disparities, giving cities 
with elected mayors revenue-raising powers and more decision-making 
powers over local planning and infrastructure development. Part of 
the challenge is to get the right balance between local initiative and 
central direction. In addition, the structure of local government is an 
impediment to the success of such policy, as it does not encompass 
natural economic units. The recent report by the NIC on the Oxford-
Milton Keynes corridor highlights these issues, also emphasising the 
need for a joined up approach to housing, jobs and infrastructure.27 





Given these regional imbalances, another challenge is to develop 
new arrangements for regional support when the UK leaves 
the EU. The EU has played an important role in balancing UK regional 
disparities through the subsidies provided by EU structural funds. 
Following Brexit, similar support will have to be funded directly by 
the UK taxpayer and similar frameworks will need to be put in place 
for guiding it.
Industrial strategy in practice
Unlike other areas of macroeconomic policy there is no single 
international “best practice” industrial strategy. At different levels of 
government – national, regional and city-level – different countries 
have historically experimented with a variety of interventions to actively 
promote growth, address market failures and improve competitiveness. 
From a focus on exports as the criterion for state-support in Korea and 
Taiwan, to Finland’s focus on ICT investment as an enabler, different 
countries have sought to develop competitive advantages through 
the interaction of government and business. 
The history of Industrial policy
British Prime Ministers have a rich tradition when it comes to 
industrial strategy. The country’s first Prime Minister was an early 
pioneer: Robert Walpole’s 1721 reforms included subsidies and taxes 
designed to support Britain’s wool manufacturers, and as a result the 
industry became Britain’s main export, which in turn did much to pay 
for the imports which powered the industrial revolution. Walpole wrote 
into the King’s speech (1721) that: “it is evident that nothing so much 
contributes to promote the public well-being as the exportation of 
manufactured goods and the importation of foreign raw material.” 
In the US, interventions to protect infant industries and promote 
exporting businesses formed the basis of the policies that Alexander 
Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, set out in the 1840s.28 
A subsequent period characterised by laissez-faire capitalism and free 
trade came to end with the advent of the First World War. The post-
World War II period heralded a pivot towards more interventionist 
industrial policy across most European countries.29 Between 1948 and 
1952, recipients of the Marshall Plan funds (including the UK, France, 
West Germany and a further fifteen European countries) were obligated 
to establish long-term investment plans for national recovery. In 1961, 
the UK established the National Economic Development Office to bring 
together industrialists, academics, trade unions and government to 
design industrial modernisation programmes. 
The UK’s industrial policy of the 1960s and particularly 1970s 
consisted of a number of policy mistakes with the government 
heavily subsidising individual firms which eventually failed.30 
The period was also characterised by poor economy-wide decisions 
including costly investment subsidies, misdirected R&D spending, 
protectionism, weak competition policy and a tax system which 
discouraged enterprise. 
There were also policy successes during this period, particularly 
in pharmaceuticals and aerospace. The procurement policies of the 
NHS encouraged R&D, and government supported medical research 
at UK universities. In aerospace Rolls-Royce was nationalized in 1971 
and then privatized in 1987; the company went on to become highly-
profitable as one of the largest producers of civil-aircraft engines in 
the world.31
With the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, industrial strategy 
swung out of vogue once again. Thatcher pared industrial strategy 
back, phasing out both industry-focused and economy-wide policies. 
Selective industrial policy fell out of favour due to the failures of the 
1960s and 1970s, and also because EU rules on state aid constrained 
policy. From this period, UK productivity growth began to pick up, 
reversing a century of relative economic decline. Increased competition 
appears to have been the key driver of this, together with improved 
labour market flexibility, privatisation and lower marginal tax rates.32
When Tony Blair’s Labour government instigated wide-ranging 
economic reforms, most were economy-wide including a new emphasis 
on R&D, public capital investment, and a long-term commitment to 
28 Grabas and Nutzenadel (2013).
29 Britain incubated the notion of industrial strategy before transitioning to free 
trade in 1860, signified by the signing of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between 
Britain and France.
30 See Crafts and Hughes (2013).
31 See Lazonick and Prencipe (2005).
32 See Crafts (2012) and Corry et al. (2011).
A seamstress at Barbour’s factory in South Shields. 
The company now sells clothing in over 40 countries 
worldwide. Bethany Clarke.
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public education and expenditure on science. Importantly, there were 
a number of reforms that significantly strengthened competition policy 
during this period.33 While the Blair government was different 
from its Conservative predecessor in many respects, the lack 
of industry-focused policy was common to both. 
The financial crisis of 2008 changed this, rekindling political interest 
in industrial strategy in the UK and abroad. Faced with falling or 
stagnating growth, high debt levels (constraining fiscal policy) and 
the limits of monetary policy (as central bank reserve rates fell rapidly 
towards zero), many countries looked to industrial strategy as a potential 
lever. As the UK’s 2010 Liberal-Conservative coalition government 
developed its industrial strategy, Japan, Germany, China and others 
were stepping up their industrial intervention. At the start of 2017 
industrial strategy, perhaps the most mercurial area of economic 
thinking, is on a new upswing – both in the UK and overseas.
International Case Studies 
Successful industrial policy has often been characterised by countries 
learning from others before them: the US and Germany built on Britain’s 
industrial policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, Japan leveraged success stories 
from Germany; and in the twentieth century China and Korea applied 
Japan’s learnings to their own strategies.34 Looking to other countries 
or settings is thus a crucial building block in designing a new industrial 
strategy for Britain. There is no single international “best practice” 
industrial strategy. The success of a strategy – and associated industrial 
policy interventions – is a function of each country or region’s own 
strengths and weaknesses, historical and economic context. 
Government funded R&D: US
It is well established that the private sector underinvests in R&D, due 
to its failure to internalise the wider social benefits from inventions 
and the uncertain, long-term nature of potential payoffs. Moreover, 
as previously discussed there is robust empirical evidence suggesting 
that government-financed R&D spills over to the private sector. Such 
considerations have led governments around the world to finance 
basic and applied research.
33 The 1998 Competition Act and the 2002 Enterprise Act both strengthened the 
competition authorities. In particular there was an enhanced role and greater 
autonomy for the Competition Commission, a depoliticisation of merger reviews 
and tougher punishments for cartels.
34 Chang and Adreoni (2014).
The US provides an important example of the success of 
government financed research, which has been the source of 
some of the most significant post-war innovations. A commonly 
cited example is that all the technologies that have gone into the iPhone 
were initially government funded: the Internet, GPS, its touch-screen 
display and voice-activation.35 
Some of these successes are by-products of a wider research “mission”. 
A key example is the internet, the origins of which trace back to the US 
government’s efforts to build spy-resistant communication networks 
in the 1960s. The first incarnation of the internet, “ARPAnet” was 
created by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (later DARPA), 
a section of the military devoted to secret weapon systems. In fact 
there is wider evidence that military spending in the US has been an 
important source of private sector innovation which is likely to be a 
function of its scale over the decades since WWII and its high-tech 
nature.36 It has been argued that in addition to the funding that 
enabled basic research, credit should also go to the competitive and 
market-oriented nature of the university system in the US, and the 
fact that DARPA did not tightly control the projects, encouraged wide 
dissemination of research, and involved small firms.37 38 
The US experience suggests that when a government mission, motivated 
by political or societal concerns involves significant R&D, efforts should 
be made to maximise spillovers via promoting information flow and 
collaboration between universities and the private sector. 
Other discoveries are the direct result of targeted research. An example 
here is Google’s search algorithm which was originally based on 
research financed by the National Science Foundation (NSF), via its 
“Digital Library Initiative” which was interested in more accessible 
interfaces for data collections.39 One of the first related grants went 
to Stanford University, where Larry Page, then a graduate student, 
and Sergey Brin invented “PageRank” which survives as one of the 
main components of Google today. 
This case illustrates the importance of government funding for basic 
research. By its nature, the applications of early-stage basic research 
are uncertain, but it is important that funding allocations are based 
on a competitive process using independent expert reviewers. The 
UK Research Councils have a similar model. The success of the US in 
inventing ground-breaking technologies which are then commercialised 
successfully illustrates the importance of links between universities 
and businesses. 
35 See Mazzucato (2015).
36 See Draca (2013). 
37 Rosenberg (2000).
38 Fishback (2007). 
39 The NSF is an independent federal agency which supports basic research in US 
universities.
46
Setting out a clear and co-ordinated plan: Korea 
South Korea, one of the “East Asian Tigers”, is a well-known case 
of successful catch–up growth, fuelled by exports and fast-paced 
industrialisation. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Korean industrial 
strategy was centrally planned, protectionist, and highly interventionist. 
Policies included import protection, export promotion, credit and foreign 
exchange rationing. These types of policy are rarely used by Western 
democracies like the UK, but Korean industrial strategy provides 
lessons on the importance of strong and joined-up institutions 
and a long-term strategy with government monitoring its 
success against pre-determined targets. 
Industrialisation was meticulously planned by the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), a government department which co-ordinated policy 
across different levels of government. The EPB created a series of 
rolling five-year plans from 1962 to 1992, which worked down from 
overriding objectives, to targets, to proposed policy interventions 
and business actions, to allocation of resources (the EPB, unlike most 
business departments around the world, had budgetary powers).
Korea’s policies were sequenced and coherent; long-term plans provided 
a policy road map that business leaders understood. Co-ordination was 
also enabled by “deliberation councils” in key industries, a concept 
borrowed from Japan. These consisted of government officials, industry 
representatives, and more “objective” observers such as academics 
or journalists.40
Key to the effectiveness of policies aimed at boosting human capital 
was that they sought to anticipate future demand for skills. For 
example, in the 1960s education policy prioritised literacy, but since 
the 1970s it has developed to promote research excellence as Korea 
has sought innovation-led growth.41 The Korean government has also 
consistently spent heavily on R&D, and provided R&D incentives to 
the private sector. In 2015, Korea ranked 6th in terms of patents per 
capita, up from 11th place in 2010. 
40 See Chang et al. (2013).
41 OECD (2012). 
Targeted Subsidies: Germany’s energy transition
In 2010, a new commitment to decarbonised energy supplies was 
passed into German legislation. This energy transition – Energiewende 
– involves a stated target to generate 40-45% of electricity from 
renewables by 2025, rising to over 80% by 2050. Energy affordability 
and reliability over the long-term and reducing import dependency 
have also been drivers of this policy. Energiewende provides a 
useful example of how a government “mission” can have 
implications for specific sectors and industry as a whole. 
The policy works through targeted subsidies worth around €20 billion 
each year. The government guarantees investors in non-carbon forms 
of energy that: (i) their energy will go into the grid before carbonised 
sources and (ii) at prices fixed for twenty years (a recent reform 
will involve auctions to set these prices). While this implies a rise in 
energy costs, intensive users (mainly in manufacturing) qualify for 
exemptions in order to preserve their international competitiveness. 
There are a number of problems with the policy, for example high 
energy costs for consumers and the businesses not benefiting from 
exemptions, and less progress cutting overall emissions, but Germany 
has made good progress in terms of the stated target of raising the 
share of renewables in electricity generation, which reached 30% 
in 2015 (compared to 3.6% in 1990).42 
A key beneficiary has been the German green industry which is now 
a world leader (accounting for over half of European inventions 
in climate change mitigation technologies).43 This could lead to 
wider economic benefit since there is evidence that R&D in green 
technologies has greater spillovers to the rest of the economy than 
environmentally “dirty” technologies, and can boost productivity.44
Competitive procurement: UK television
The UK’s public-service broadcasters – the BBC and Channel 4 – 
provide an example of a hybrid system, in which government support 
has allowed the private sector to flourish. The BBC is the world’s 
oldest and largest broadcaster with 21,000 full-time employees, 
broadcasting in 28 languages. It is quasi-public, raising funds using 
a “licence-fee” that all UK television owners must pay. Reflecting 
the competition and supply-chain implications of its influence, the 
BBC is subject to government-agreed supply arrangements. Channel 
4 is wholly owned by the UK government but independently run, 
buying content from private sector providers using revenues from 
advertising sales. This set up has stimulated private industry in 
42 See Rutten (2014).
43 See Climate Change Mitigation Technologies in Europe - evidence from patent 
and economic data (2015). Report for the European Patent Office.
44 See Dechezlepretre et al. (2013).
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an interesting way, with potential lessons for wider industrial 
strategy.
The BBC operates under clear rules. The Broadcast Act (1990) and 
the Communications Act (2003) require it to commission 25% of 
its television programmes from the independent sector each year. 
A further 25% of productions must be commissioned through a 
competitive process in which both in-house BBC and independent 
producers can compete. The rules limit the extent to which the BBC 
can crowd-out the private market – it makes the corporation part 
competitor, part customer. 
The BBC also has regional targets. These specify that 50% of television 
production spend must come from companies located outside of 
London, with 17% to come from Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Similar arrangements apply to radio and online. These regional 
rules limit the dominance of London-based companies. 
Private companies in the UK are global leaders in the provision of 
independent television. The sector is led by the so-called “super-
indies” (for example All3Media and Shine Group), and a satellite of 
smaller firms that supply to both the BBC and these large players. 
The BBC spent £441 million on external commissions across all its 
channels in 2015. Channel 4 is not far behind (spending £403 million 
in 2015) as it does not have an in-house production division.45 In total, 
2,700 creative suppliers provided content to the BBC, of which 80% 
were small or micro-sized.46 While it is difficult to precisely determine 
a causal impact of the BBC on the UK economy some estimates of 
its value-added suggest that it generates £2 of economic value for 
every £1 of licence fee.47 
There are differing opinions about the value of the BBC to the UK 
economy, with some arguing that it over-reaches in today’s increasingly 
fragmented media landscape. Despite these tensions the BBC 
provides an example of how public sector procurement can 
support private sector growth and reduce regional imbalances. 
Central to the success have been efforts to ensure a competitive 
commissioning process with the BBC subject to a “Fair Trading” 
audit. This safeguards the wider industry from potentially unfair 
arrangements between the BBC and its subsidiaries, or negative 
market impacts from its activities. This transparent and competitive 
process, with regular external review is one that wider UK policies 
could learn from. 
45 See Ofcom (2016).
46 See BBC (2015).
47 See BBC (2013).
Modern Industrial Strategy in the UK 
In 2010, thirty-one years after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
ushered in an era of free markets and privatisation, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government turned to industrial strategy 
as a potential lever to stimulate and redistribute growth. In 2013, 
the government published its industrial strategy, which contained 
support for eleven key sectors and eight key technologies. The sectors 
were all judged to be strategically important, “tradable” and with a 
“proven commitment to innovation”. Support has involved forums 
for industry leaders and government to discuss barriers to growth; 
the development of specific training institutions or initiatives within 
the sector; and some match-funded financial commitments to certain 
aspects of the sectors. The technologies all had established roots in 
the UK and high growth potential. Funding for the development of 
R&D centres for these technologies has been provided, some of which 
has been used to set up or enlarge Catapult centres. Following the 
2015 general election, the industrial strategy was downplayed but the 
frameworks have remained in place. Early evaluations of elements of 
these policies have found them to be successful.48 However evidence 
set out above suggests the coalition’s industrial strategy was too 
narrow, focusing mainly on high growth, high tech sectors, or those 
where the UK possesses comparative advantage, rather than on 
larger low-productivity sectors which employ a large section of the 
workforce and where large gains can be made. Regional industrial 
policies, particularly the development of the north of England have 
been a focus of recent years.49 
Theresa May’s government has committed to a new industrial 
strategy in order “to get the whole economy firing” – with a focus 
on infrastructure, house-building and measures to raise Britain’s 
stagnating productivity. As part of this, the government has set out 
a Green Paper asking for recommendations. The CEP will be happy to 
provide evidence as part of the Green Paper process, beginning with 
the recommendations in the next section. 
48 See the Hauser Review (2014). 
49 During this period George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, also began 
exploring place-based policies such as the Northern Powerhouse and wider devolution 
to City-regions with elected Mayors – these are to be carried forward by his successor 
as Chancellor, Philip Hammond.
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Recommendations
The UK has strong frameworks governing monetary, fiscal and 
competition policy (Table 3.1). Objectives are defined and enshrined 
in law. Independent agents play a role in offering advice and in some 
cases taking policy decisions. The remit of such bodies is transparent, 
with justifications for their advice presented in statutory publications. 
This has the potential to create a more stable framework and promotes 
open government with external scrutiny by think-tanks, journalists 
and academics. British industrial strategy lacks every element 
of this general framework. Its focus, existence, and even the name 
of the department implementing it are subject to the whims of Prime 
Ministers or Business Secretaries. This creates political uncertainty 
and hampers long-term decision making. The lack of transparency 
undermines scrutiny and creates uncertainty for private investors. 
The Commission recommends that industrial strategy should 
be put on the same footing as other areas of economic policy. 
This should include:
•  A new law or long-lasting mandate, including a new state aid 
law. The existing EU State Aid framework has prevented arbitrary 
forms of political intervention in the economy. Developing a new 
legal framework to replace it is essential once the UK leaves the EU. 
This will help to ensure that the new industrial strategy is competitive 
and contestable. 
•  A set of public guidelines for intervention. The development of a 
set of transparent (and preferably quantifiable) rules and guidelines for 
intervention in particular sectors, technologies or places are required. 
Competitive processes should be used wherever possible to ensure 
that government support is channelled to its most beneficial use.
•  Independent decision making or oversight. The ultimate objective 
should be a long-term industrial strategy that is isolated from political 
cycles. There is a menu of options to choose from – from the Bank 
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, to Britain’s independent 
budget, antitrust and infrastructure bodies. Any one of these would 
be better than the current ad hoc set up. This independent body 
should strive to overcome the fragmentation of authority within 
central government and between local and central government. 
•  Enhanced transparency and accountability. The government 
should therefore publish a long-term plan setting shared objectives 
and aligning decision-makers across government, industry and 
other stakeholders. 
 
•  External debate and scrutiny. The body responsible for industrial 
strategy should publish a standardised Industrial Strategy Report every 
year on the state of British business. (In line with the OBR’s Economic 
and Fiscal Outlook, or the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report). 
This would provide regular material on the productivity of UK firms, 
with updates on industry- or location-specific policies, together with 
their costs and measured impacts.
With this new framework in place the government should pursue six 
key priorities. These are:
•  Skills shortages. A plan to tackle shortages in skills at all levels is 
needed, in particular addressing basic skills deficiencies and ensuring 
that the UK utilises and invests in female talent.
•  Low-productivity sectors. Significant market failures are holding 
back productivity in low-wage, low-productivity sectors that employ 
large numbers of UK workers. Industrial Strategy must tackle these 
problems through improving skills and technology adoption.
•  Small firms. Focus financial support towards high growth potential 
firms that face financing constraints, rather than small firms in general. 
Expand the role of the British Business Bank (BBB). Review whether 
tax and regulatory frameworks are distorting firm size, incentivising 
firms to stay small. Address obstacles to small firms improving their 
management practices.
•  Universities and the private sector. Enhance collaboration between 
universities, government and the private sector, building on existing 
government frameworks, for example the Catapult model, and 
continue to increase support for R&D into technologies of the future 
where the UK has comparative advantage. 
•  City-growth policies. Cities are central to the UK’s success. Continue 
to devolve power and support local leaders to create smart, connected 
cities. Invest in digital infrastructure and environmentally friendly 
transport structures. Ensure that housing supply matches demand 
in growing cities.
•  Growth, environment and wellbeing. Define a series of focused 
public goals or missions that industrial strategy will support. These 
should include environmental sustainability and improving health 
and social care outcomes. Progress in these areas is important in its 
own right, and is also likely to have a positive impact on growth in 
the long run. Government should support innovative companies that 
work in these areas, ensuring that the tender process is competitive 
and knowledge diffusion is promoted.
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TABLE 3.1: EXAMPLES OF UK POLICY FRAMEWORKS
 Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy Competition Policy
Policy tool •  Bank Rate
•  Asset Purchases
•  Tax and spending •  Merger clearance and 
remedies 
•  Market investigations, 
•  Penalties for anti-competitive 
behaviour
Legal framework •  Bank of England Act 1998
•  Bank of England and Financial 
Services Act 2016
•  Budget Responsibility & 
National Audit Act 2011
•  Charter for Budget 
Responsibility
•  Competition Act 1998
•  Enterprise Act 2002




•  Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC): 
external members
•  Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR)
•  Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) Board 
independent panel members
Mandate or guidelines •  Inflation target •  Fiscal rules •  Duty to promote competition 
for the benefit of consumers.
Transparent publication •  Inflation Report •  Budgets
•  Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
(EFO)
•  Merger inquiry findings
•  Market investigation findings
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The Port of Felixstowe is Britain’s biggest and busiest container port, and one of the largest in Europe.  
It welcomes approximately 3,000 ships each year.
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4. Openness
The UK is one of the most open countries in the 
world. In 2015 goods and services worth over £1 
trillion (60% of GDP) flowed in and out of the UK 
as it traded with over 190 economies across the 
globe. Capital flows freely, with the result that 
British citizens and companies have around £10 
trillion in overseas investments  while foreigners 
have invested a similar amount here. People are 
also mobile; Britain welcomed some 36 million 
tourists in 2015, and there are currently around 
5.6 million foreign nationals living in the UK, while 
around 5 million British citizens live overseas.
The result of the June 2016 referendum on EU 
membership will change the way goods, services, 
capital and people cross the UK’s borders. The 
main task for policymakers is to find a set 
of arrangements that foster opportunities, 
competitiveness and sustainable growth for the 
UK. This chapter reviews the UK’s experience 
of the movement of goods, capital and people 
to provide evidence-based recommendations 
about how the UK can make a success of its new 
relationships with the EU and rest of the world.
The background: The UK current 
account
International trade and finance have been important elements of the 
UK economy for centuries. In the 1700s cotton, coffee and other 
raw materials were imported from the colonies, refined in the UK 
and exported to overseas buyers, many in mainland Europe. By the 
early 1800s British investors were active overseas, sending funds to 
buy stakes in American railroads and Argentinian mines. The British 
diaspora is longstanding too. In all these ways the UK has reaped the 
benefits of openness.
Over the past 20 years the UK went from a current account balance to 
a current account deficit: The UK now buys more goods and services 
from abroad than it sells as exports. Income on UK investments made 
abroad is lower than foreigners’ income earned on investments here. 
This has resulted in a large current account deficit (Figure 4.1). A 
current account deficit (like a budget deficit) is not necessarily a bad 
sign, especially if an economy is borrowing from abroad to invest in a 
way that underpins future growth. But the fact that UK exports and 
investment are falling short provides an important background for 
upcoming trade negotiations.

















































Notes: Quarterly data, % of GDP. Source: ONS Balance of Payments Statistics.
Postgraduate student, Gang Wu, and Professor Anne 
Dell are conducting research into immune disorders at 




In 2015, the UK exported goods and services worth £517 billion, or 
around 28% of GDP. Imports were £547 billion, with a resulting trade 
deficit of almost £30 billion. This deficit is longstanding – the last time 
UK trade was in balance was in the late 1990s. The headline figures 
reveal important differences between the UK’s trade performance in 
terms of goods and services, industries and different parts of the world.















































Notes: Quarterly data, % of GDP. Source: ONS Balance of Payments Statistics.
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Notes: Imports and exports (goods only), 2015, £bn. Source: ONS. 
Exports are a source of foreign income, and firms that export tend 
to be more productive and pay higher wages. As a share of GDP 
UK goods exports have been stable for the past 60 years, despite a 
number of large swings in the exchange rate over this period. Goods 
imports have gradually increased over time, creating a persistent and 
widening deficit in goods trade (Figure 4.2).
Data on trade of goods by type shows that the UK suffers from a 
shortfall across the board (Figure 4.3). The biggest deficits are on 
electrical machinery and clothing. While cars are a key export, there 
is still a £6 billion deficit on trade in the sector overall. Where the UK 
does have surpluses they are much smaller: machinery, aircraft and 
works of art all recorded surpluses of around £2 billion.
Trade in services is very different. There has been a marked change 
in UK services exports over the past 60 years, with a large increase 
in services trade starting in the early 1990s. Since then exports have 
risen more quickly than imports, creating a persistent surplus on trade 
in services (Figure 4.4).
Since the EU referendum, there have been reports of potential future 
trade deals with a number of non-EU countries, for example Australia 
and New Zealand. These are positive developments – but it is 
important to take into account the importance of larger and 
closer markets to UK trade.Burberry’s flagship store in Beijing. Burberry has 
invested heavily in the Chinese retail market.
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International trade is highly concentrated. For example, while the UK 
trades with over 190 countries, the top 20 trade partners account for 
80% of all goods trade. Over 60% of total trade (goods and services) 
is with the EU and US alone (Figure 4.5). The crucial deals that the 
UK must strive for over the next two years are therefore with the EU 
and the US. 
The EU accounts for 44% of the UK’s exports and 53% of imports. 
Europe is the UK’s natural trading partner due to its economic proximity 
(geographical location and output mix) and market size, these are 
referred to as “gravity forces” in economic models of international 
trade. 
The pattern of trade with EU partners has shifted over the past 20 
years. In 1997 trade with Germany and France was broadly balanced. 
Since then the UK has developed a sizeable deficit with France and 
a much larger one with Germany. The balance of trade with every 
large EU nation is in deficit. The lone exception is Ireland. Trade with 
non-EU partners shows a much less regular pattern. Trade with the 
US results in a large surplus: almost £14 billion in 2015. Trade with 
the UK’s second most important non-EU partner, China, generates a 
substantial deficit. Overall, trade with non-EU generated a small surplus 
over the past 5 years, this narrowed at the end of 2016 leaving trade 
broadly balanced. 














































Notes: Quarterly data, % of GDP. Source: ONS Balance of Payments Statistics.
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Notes: Imports and exports of goods and services, 2015, £bn.  Source: ONS, 
UK Trade Quarterly data.
Benchmarking performance against other countries
Comparing this export performance against that of other advanced 
economies helps clarify the UK’s strengths and weaknesses. As an 
exporter of goods, the UK is performing poorly compared to 
its advanced economy peers. In terms of its share of global goods 
exports, the UK is only just ahead of Italy (a country whose economy 
is nearly 20% smaller than Britain’s) and is selling less abroad than 
France. German export performance is stronger still (Figure 4.6).
In assessing export performance, it is useful to look beyond the 
headline figures and consider how much “value-added” is retained 
in the UK economy. For example, if a UK manufacturer produces a 
good domestically using raw materials predominantly sourced from 
the UK, the share of domestic value added will be high. On the other 
hand, where manufacturers import a high share of their inputs and 
do little to modify them, the share of value added retained in the UK 
is smaller and also sensitive to import prices. The UK retains a lower 
share of the value-added in goods exports than the largest exporting 
countries (Figure 4.6).
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FIGURE 4.6: COUNTRY SHARE OF GLOBAL EXPORTS, AND SHARE 
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Notes: The left hand axis shows the share of global goods exports, and the 
right hand axis shows the share of domestic value added in exports. Source: 
Comtrade (data for 2014) and OECD (data for 2011).
An industrial perspective pinpoints the UK’s weaknesses. In both the 
US and Germany two sectors – machinery and chemicals – account for 
more than 50% of goods exports (Figure 4.7). The scale of the UK’s 
shortfall next to Germany here is striking: German machinery exports 
are much larger than the entirety of UK goods exports. 
There is no single answer to the UK’s export shortfall, but research 
points to a number of factors. One explanation is the size distribution 
of UK firms (see Chapter 3). Larger businesses are more likely to be 
exporters: around 40% of large businesses export goods or services, 
compared to around 10% of small businesses.1 When compared to 
advanced-economy peers the UK suffers from a gap in mid-sized 
companies – the “Mittelstand” in Germany is made up of small to 
mid-sized businesses with a strong export orientation. 
Limited access to finance can hold back exports too. Recent research into 
what explains firms’ propensity to export suggests that financial factors 
– including the availability of equity finance – play an important role. 
Exporting can imply fixed start-up costs, meaning that entrepreneurs 
unable to access capital cannot finance their exports.2 CBI analysis 
points also to a lack of consistency across government policies that 
support exporters and a lack of awareness amongst businesses with 
1 ONS (2014a). 
2 See Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016). 
regard to the government support that is on offer.3
The UK does fare better when benchmarked in the global services 
trade, both in terms of share in total exports where it comes second 
to the US, and also in the domestic share in value added (Figure 4.8). 
Much of this is driven by financial and business services exports, which 
account for nearly 70% of UK services exports (Figure 4.9). Given this 
pattern of specialisation, the UK is particularly vunerable to non-tariff 
barriers, such as licensing and regulatory constraints, which are the 
main obstacles to services exports.






























Notes: Data for 2014. Source: Comtrade.
A useful measure of a country’s specialisation in a particular sector 
is “revealed comparative advantage” (RCA). This is calculated by 
comparing the sector’s share in a country’s exports to that sector’s share 
in global exports. If the ratio of these two measures is greater than 1, 
a country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in a sector. 
3 CBI (2015).
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FIGURE 4.8: COUNTRY SHARE OF GLOBAL EXPORTS, AND SHARE 
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Notes: The left hand axis shows the share of global goods exports, and the 
right hand axis shows the share of domestic value added in exports. Source: 
Comtrade (data for 2014) and OECD 2015 (data for 2011).
There are a number of sectors in both goods and services where the UK 
does well in terms of RCA. In goods, 18 out of 110 sub-sectors have 
an RCA larger than one; the highest RCA being in Aerospace (Figure 
4.10, which shows the top 18 sectors in terms of RCA). In services, 
RCA is calculated at a more aggregated level; in 5 sectors the UK has 
an RCA larger than one, including insurance, finance, other business 
and cultural/recreational services (Figure 4.11). A number of these 
sectors have been the focus of the government’s recent industrial 
strategy, discussed in Chapter 3.
Even without the EU referendum, significant policy changes are needed 
in the UK: these have two fundamental planks. First, the number of 
UK exporting companies needs to be boosted. Second, steps need to 
be taken via international fora, including the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), to increase the share of services in world trade. The first would 
eliminate UK weaknesses, the second play to our strengths.




























Notes: Data for 2014. Source: Comtrade.
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The impact of Brexit on trade
Open trade allows the UK to specialise in industries in which it has a 
comparative advantage. It benefits consumers through lower prices 
and by increasing the variety of goods and services available. Trade 
therefore raises output, incomes and living standards. 
EU membership has increased trade between the UK and the EU 
through the removal of tariff barriers and reductions in non-tariff 
barriers via the Single Market. Prior to the UK joining the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, around one third of UK trade 
was with the EEC. By 2015, the 27 other EU members accounted for 
44% of the UK’s exports and 53% of imports. 
Whatever model is adopted, trade costs with the EU are likely to increase 
post-Brexit, and trade with the EU to diminish as a consequence. 
Previous CEP analysis of the effects of Brexit from reduced trade 
(accounting also for the saving from reduced contribution to the 
EU budget) estimates that there would be fall in income per capita 
of between 1.3% and 2.6%.4 The lower estimate assumes that the 
UK remains part of the EEA, and the upper estimate assumes that 
the UK would trade with the EU under WTO rules. The effect would 
be substantially higher once long run effects of reduced trade on 
productivity are included. The analysis suggests that the loss in income 
would be widely shared across society. A series of other estimates 
have been made by HM Treasury, the Office for Budget Responsibility 
and the Bank of England. While estimates vary due to differences in 
assumptions and methods, they all suggest that Brexit will lead to a 
substantial fall in real income, and therefore living standards.
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4 Dhingra et al. (2016a).
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Previous CEP analysis also calculates the likely impact if the UK were 
to unilaterally remove all tariffs on imports into the UK from anywhere 
in the world. The estimated loss in income per capita does not change 
much and is in the range 1% to 2.3%. The reasons for this is that 
WTO tariffs are already low, so further reductions do not make much 
difference. Non-tariff barriers are likely to be more important and 
have a greater bearing on trade costs in future.
Foreign Direct Investment
The impact of the referendum result could also have a deterrent effect 
on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and lead to a further fall in national 
income. FDI refers to international investments made by residents and 
businesses from one country into another, in the form of establishing 
a new business, or acquiring an existing business. Inward FDI tends 
to raise productivity which increases output and wages.5 FDI 
has a direct impact as foreign owned firms in the UK are typically 
more productive and pay higher wages compared to their domestic 
counterparts. FDI also has an indirect impact as the technologies or 
management practices in foreign owned firms can be adopted by 
domestic firms, often through the supply chain of multinationals.6































































Notes: OECD FDI Stocks, 2015, share of total (total OECD inward FDI stock 
$16.3 trilion). Source: OECD.
5 See for example Bloom et al. (2012) and and Haskel et al. (2007).
6 Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
The UK has been successful at attracting inward FDI, and is host to 
nearly 10% of the inward FDI stocks across the OECD, surpassed only 
by the US (Figure 4.12). UK inward FDI stocks have been consistently 
high as a share of GDP compared to the UK’s main peers, at around 
55% of GDP since 2012 (Figure 4.13). The bulk of this investment has 
come from EU countries (48%) and the US (24%). Inward FDI from 
the EU has nearly doubled since 2005 (Figure 4.14). 











































These patterns are consistent with the “gravity” models of trade flows 
whose theoretical foundations apply equally to factor input flows such 
as capital. The greatest FDI capital flows occur between geographically 
close and / or large economies. Of the total inward FDI from the EU, 
86% is explained by investment from the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Germany, France and Spain.
Almost two-thirds of UK inward FDI stocks relate to services, and 
26% to financial services alone. Manufacturing is the next largest 
receiver of inward FDI at 20%. A key difference in composition is with 
Germany that has a much smaller share of FDI in its manufacturing 
sector (Figure 4.15).
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Source: ONS, Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Involving UK Companies, 
2014 (Directional Principle).
Around 14% of UK private sector employment is in foreign owned 
firms. Affiliates owned by EU and US corporations account for 7% 
and 4% of UK’s total employment respectively. The sectors with 
the highest shares are manufacturing, utilities and financial services 
(Figure 4.16).
Demand and supply side considerations motivate FDI decisions, 
and the UK has historically done well on both. On the demand 
side, the UK has offered investors access to a large domestic market 
of 60 million consumers. But while the UK is a member of the EU, 
firms have border-free access to a further 440 million consumers 
via the European Single Market. This holds for both manufacturing 
and services sectors. Moreover, “passporting rights” have allowed 
financial services firms to operate seamlessly across country borders 
within the EU.
The UK has flexible labour markets, a skilled workforce and a strong 
rule of law – all of which make it attractive for FDI. Access to EU markets 
has made the UK particularly attractive for firms with “Global Value 
Chains”.7 Shipping of goods along the value chain is facilitated by the 
single market, with firms able to purchase inputs straightforwardly 
from other EU countries. Member countries do not need to comply 
with “rules of origin” concerning the inputs used in production (these 
are the criteria which determine the national source of a product, 
7 The process through which firms seek to optimise their production processes through 
locating different stages of production in different locations.
and hence the level of customs duty), trade is tariff-free within the 
EU, and it is subject to minimal non-tariff barriers. Moreover, the UK 
attracts highly skilled workers from the entire EU market. 
The UK has also had high levels of outward FDI, though this has been 
declining as a share of GDP (Figure 4.17). This decline has coincided 
with decreasing returns on foreign investment. The patterns of outward 
FDI are similar to inward FDI in terms of international partners and 
sectors. Nearly 40% of outward FDI is into the EU, and 50% relates 
to the services sector.































Notes: US data are for 2011, Other includes public corporations, property data, 
bank holdings and monetary financial institutions (MFI). Source: ONS.
The impact of Brexit on FDI
There are three reasons why Brexit might reduce inward FDI. First, being 
in the Single Market makes the UK an attractive export platform for 
multinational firms. Second, multinationals have complex supply chains 
and face co-ordination costs between their headquarters and local 
branches which would become more difficult to manage if the UK left 
the EU. For example, component parts would be subject to different 
regulations and costs; and intra-firm staff transfers would become 
more difficult with tougher migration controls. Third, uncertainty over 
the shape of the future trade arrangements between the UK and the 
EU would also tend to dampen FDI flows.
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Source: ONS. Data for 2014.
Based on a statistical model of bilateral FDI flows between 34 OECD 
countries from 1985 to 2013, Bruno et al. (2016) estimated that there 
is a positive effect of being in the EU of between 14% and 38% 
higher FDI inflows.8 Since leaving the EU is likely to have a smaller 
proportionate effect than joining, this suggests that leaving the EU 
will reduce FDI inflows to the UK by about 22%. The same analysis 
finds that membership of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) is not sufficient to restore the FDI benefits of being in the EU. 
It suggests that when it comes to FDI flows, a comprehensive free 
trade deal after Brexit is a poor substitute for full EU membership. 
This fall in FDI flows is likely to translate into a fall in national income 
of around 3.4%.
The car industry and the finance sector provide two useful case 
studies of how high FDI sectors might be impacted by Brexit. 
Cars are a recent success story for UK manufacturing. In 2014, the 
car industry employed nearly 300,000 workers and contributed 
around 5.1% to total UK exports; 40% of its car exports were to 
the EU. It is therefore useful to understand how Brexit might impact 
on international car company decisions on where to locate their 
production, as well as levels of car production and prices. Analysis 
described in Dhingra et al (2016b) assumes that Brexit would lead 
to an increase in trade costs (via tariff and non-tariff barriers), and 
8 Dhingra et al. (2016b).
coordination costs (for example if transfers of staff are more difficult 
due to immigration controls, or different regulatory standards make 
it more difficult to work across borders).9 
It is estimated that total UK car production could fall by 12% or almost 
180,000 cars per year, as car manufacturers move some production 
away from the UK. Prices faced by UK consumers also rise by around 
2.5% in this scenario as the cost of imported cars and their components 
increase. The potential impact would be much smaller if the UK faced 
no trade barriers on cars and car components with the rest of the EU 
(for example, if it joined EFTA). Prices would be stable in this scenario, 
but coordination costs could lead to some firms relocating plants (the 
fall in car production in this scenario is around 2%). 








































9 Head and Mayer (2015).
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The finance sector accounts for over a quarter of inward FDI stocks, 
and represents a high share of employment and GVA in the economy. 
Crucial for the cross border operations of this sector has been the 
“passporting” regime enjoyed by EU member states. This allows a 
financial institution located in the UK to provide services across the 
EU subject only to UK regulations. Even with such rights as those 
enjoyed by Norway, which as a member of the EEA has access to 
the Single Market, there still seem to be greater difficulties in doing 
business with the EU.
Outside the EEA, passporting rights seem unlikely. Switzerland (in 
EFTA) has no passporting rights, so Swiss financial institutions mostly 
get access to the EU via special bilateral treaties with the EU, which 
still require permissions to set up branches in EU member countries. 
This is one of the reasons that Swiss financial institutions have often 
set up subsidiaries in the UK. The Swiss example shows that while 
trade with the EU will still be possible it will be more costly after the 
UK leaves the EU.
The likely impact of Brexit on outward FDI is less clear. UK investors 
might increase investments in the EU (for example through setting up 
subsidiaries that can benefit from the Single Market), but this could 
displace investments to the rest of the world. 
The likelihood that access to the EU market will be more difficult 
following Brexit underlines the need to strengthen the business 
environment in the UK in a range of policy areas as outlined 
throughout this report. We now discuss the different trade options 
facing the UK post-Brexit.
Trade options outside the EU 
The political and legal landscape surrounding Brexit is evolving at a 
fast pace and there is still a high degree of uncertainty over its likely 
form. A number of options appear to have been largely ruled out 
(these are shaded in grey in Table 4.1 which shows the key attributes 
of different Brexit models). In its recent White Paper on the UK’s exit 
from the EU, Government has stated that border control will be a 
priority and that therefore, the UK cannot remain in the EU’s Single 
Market.10 Moreover, staying in the Customs Union appears unlikely 
as this limits the UK’s capacity to negotiate its own trade deals which 
is another of the government’s key objectives.
10 Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland are not EU members, but have access to the 
Single Market via membership of the European Economic Area (EEA).
This implies that the UK will need to find a bespoke trade agreement 
with the EU. One option - which may be difficult politically - is re-joining 
EFTA, which would provide tariff-free trade in goods. The other option 
is to negotiate a bespoke deal of the type recently agreed with Canada. 
Neither would guarantee free trade in services, and would still result 
in significant non-tariff barriers in goods markets such as complying 
with rules of origin. The UK must therefore aim for a better deal than 
either of these options, in particular with respect to the services sectors 
where the UK has comparative advantage, acknowledging that there 
is likely to be some cost or concession to achieve it.
In order to revert to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, the 
UK would first have to become an independent member of WTO. If 
this did happen and became the default, then under WTO rules, each 
member must grant the same ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) market 
access, including charging the same tariffs, to all other WTO members. 
The UK would then have the same trading relationship with the EU as 
any other country. In the absence of any bilateral trade agreements 
with the EU (or any other countries) the UK would have to determine 
a universal set of tariff rates to apply with all trading partners. If tariffs 
are too high, imports will be more expensive, harming UK consumers 
and businesses which use significant imported inputs. While lowering 
tariffs would make imports cheaper, there is no guarantee that this 
would be reciprocated, and the UK will lose bargaining power: once 
duty-free access to the UK market has been offered, other countries 
will have no incentive to give the UK preferential access to their own 
markets.
It is crucial that the system replacing EU membership is able to maintain 
low tariffs with the EU. But equally crucial is the need to constrain non-
tariff barriers to trade which add substantially to trade costs. Adherence 
to EU rules and regulations have been an essential component of 
reduced non-tariff barriers. So even outside the EU, it is likely that 
harmonised rules will be required in any deal that preserves high 
levels of market access. 
There are some areas that could be particularly problematic. For firms 
participating in global value chains, with high shares of imported inputs, 
the bureaucratic cost of complying with EU rules of origin are high 
and may reduce the UK’s attractiveness as a location for production 
processes. Moreover, the financial costs associated with expediting 
tax (VAT) and customs clearance are especially important for small 
exporters. As previously discussed, small and medium enterprises do not 
typically export and those that do currently focus on the EU market.11 
11 9% of SMEs export and a further 15% are in the supply chains of other businesses 
that export. Most of this relates to the EU. See BIS (2016a). 
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It has been argued that leaving the EU provides the UK with more 
freedom in designing domestic policies and regulatory frameworks 
aimed at increasing firms’ profitability, which may compensate 
for the rise in administrative costs implied by Brexit. The UK 
would have the freedom to redesign all areas currently under the 
authority of the EU, including competition policy, international 
trade regulations, and areas that rely on EU funding like regional 
development and research. However, any new subsidies or 
regulations that do not comply with EU or WTO normative 
standards may result in the imposition of further market restrictions 
from global trading partners. More generally, a lack of coordination 
in competition policies with the EU will provide more freedom for 
domestic policy design, but will leave UK firms vulnerable to anti-
dumping measures and less able to export. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that any country that exports goods to the EU has to comply 
with EU product standards. 
TABLE 4.1: BREXIT OPTIONS
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New relationships with the rest of the 
world
By exiting the EU, the UK will be allowed control over trade deals 
with non-EU countries. While the UK will now be able to seek trade 
agreements tailored to UK interests, it will have reduced bargaining 
power with large trade partners like the US and China once it is outside 
the largest trading bloc in the world. There is a risk, therefore, that 
the UK will have less power to negotiate deals that are in its long-
term interest. 
Exploratory talks have already taken place with a number of countries, 
most recently the US, but also New Zealand, Australia and Gulf nations. 
The analysis of UK trade above shows that while all such deals are 
positive developments, the UK must prioritise deals with the US and EU. 
Currently the UK and the US trade under WTO terms. Tariffs are 
already relatively low, and the largest gains would be from reducing 
non-tariff barriers, for example through regulatory harmonisation. 
This may now be more difficult. Under the previous US government, 
a wide-ranging deal was being negotiated with the EU (the TTIP) , 
but the general consensus so far is that President Trump will be more 
protectionist than his predecessor. 
In the coming years there are opportunities to increase exports to China 
and India. Both have rapidly growing middle classes with a preferences 
for goods and services where the UK has comparative advantage. 
It is important to note that deepening international integration 
with non-EU countries – in particular emerging markets - implies 
different challenges than those faced in current partnership with the 
EU. European economies are relatively similar to the UK in terms of 
education, labour costs, and environment regulations. As a result, 
much of the gains from trade within the EU are based on economies 
of scale and access to broader varieties of goods and inputs. The gains 
from trade with labour-abundant economies such as China or India 
are based on complementary patterns of factor abundance.
Immigration
Having discussed flows of goods and services, we now consider flows 
of people. 
Immigration to the UK has increased significantly over the past 20 
years. There are now around 9 million individuals (and 7.4 million 
working age adults) living in the UK who were born abroad; 5.6 million 
of these are foreign nationals. As a share of the UK population this is 
14.1%, and has risen from 5.8% in 1975. 
Around half of the change has been from other EU countries. Following 
the UK’s vote to join the EU in 1973, immigration from France and 
Germany more than doubled.12 The pace of EU immigration increased 
after 2004 and the accession of eight Eastern European countries 
(known as the “A8”).13 The number of immigrants from other EU 
countries living in the UK has tripled from 0.9 million to 3.3 million 
over this period. 
FIGURE 4.18: IMMIGRATION – SHARES OF TOTAL POPULATION




























Source: OECD. Data for 2014.
This pattern has been seen by many OECD countries. The UK does 
not stand out from its advanced economy peers with regard to its 
share of immigrants in the population or with regard to the rate of 
new inflows. The UK is, and has been for some time, a middle ranking 
country in terms of its foreign-born population share (Figure 4.18). 
12 1971 Census estimates 157,000 German-born and 36,000 French born. ONS in 
2013 estimates 297,000 German-born and 150,000 French-born.
13 The A8 comprises Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Immigration fluctuates over time, often reflecting divergences in 
economic growth between economies. For example, following 
Portugal’s 2011 recession emigration more than doubled in a single 
year 2011-2012, with remittances from Portuguese nationals that 
had relocated to Angola increasing by 84% in this same year. UK 
immigration has seen ebbs and flows. When the A8 joined the EU 
in 2004, immigration from the EU rose significantly. It then fell back 
during the 2008 financial crisis and recession that followed, resuming 
shortly thereafter, as the UK returned to growth. In 2016, the 3.3 million 
EU immigrants living in the UK represent 5.3% of the population and 
make up 35% of all immigrants living in the UK. 
Poland is now the largest source country of immigrants – at around 
940,000 – followed by India (760,000) and Pakistan (480,000) (Figure 
4.19). Lithuania supplies the most migrants per head of its own 
population: the 180,000 Lithuanian nationals living in the UK represent 
around 6% of Lithuania’s total population.
Immigration is unevenly dispersed across the UK regions, with a much 
greater concentration of immigrants in London than in the rest of the 
country (Figure 4.20). 
FIGURE 4.19: IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN














Almost 40% of London’s population was born abroad and more than 
a third (37%) of all migrants to the UK live in London. In contrast, less 
than 5% of those living in the North-East (excluding Tyne and Wear) 
were born abroad. Migrants from the EU are more evenly distributed 
across the UK, though again London accounts for the largest fraction. 
The rate of change of immigration is however greater outside London.
While immigration has risen considerably, opinion polling suggests 
the public perception is that it is higher still, with UK nationals over-
estimating the size of the immigrant population.14 Immigration was a 
key factor behind the EU referendum vote, and it seems highly unlikely 
that Britain’s new relationship with the EU will preserve the freedom 
of movement in its current form. Given public concern it is important 
to investigate and clarify the evidence on immigration’s effects on the 
UK labour market and wider economy. 
FIGURE 4.20: IMMIGRATION – SHARES OF UK LOCAL POPULATION


























Immigration and the labour market
Employment opportunities are an important driver of immigration. 
About 70% of EU immigrants say they come to the UK for work-related 
reasons, as opposed to study or joining their families.15 Even though 
immigration increases the total number of people in work or looking for 
employment, this does not necessarily mean that the opportunities of 
UK workers have been harmed. Since immigrants consume local services 
and goods, this increases demand and so improves the job prospects 
of those who produce those goods and services. In general, there is 
no fixed stock of jobs in the economy – over the past 100 years, the 
UK population has grown by around 50% while the unemployment 
rate has not trended upward. 
Immigrants do not take the majority of new jobs (jobs that are three 
months old or less). The latest data show that immigrants account 
for around 1 in 5 of all new hires. The immigrant share in new jobs 
follows the same trend as the share of immigrants in the working age 
population (Figure 4.21).
15 See ONS Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, Dec 2016.
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Alonzi’s Harbour Bar in Scarborough, Yorkshire. 
The Alonzi family have been selling ice cream in 
Scarborough since Giulian Alonzi emigrated there from 
Monte Cassino, Southern Italy, in the early 1900s.
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A disaggregated analysis, looking at individual local areas suggests 
immigration is unlikely to have increased unemployment among the 
UK-born population. This is illustrated in Figure 4.22 where each dot 
represents one of the UK’s 201 local unitary authorities, plotting the 
changes in unemployment rates of the UK-born against changes in 
EU immigration between 2008 and 2015. The line summarises the 
relationship: there is no statistically significant relationship – negative 
or positive – between changes in EU immigration and changes in 
unemployment rates of those born in the UK. The same is true for 
pay. There is no systematic link between changes in the real wages of 
UK-born workers and changes in EU immigration. Thus immigration 
appears not to have had either a systematic positive or negative 
impact on unemployment or wages. 
This is not to say that immigration is cost free. One group that does 
seem to lose out from new immigration are other recent immigrants. 
One study in particular, examining male wages in the UK from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-2000s, found that immigration reduced the 
wages of other immigrants who had previously settled in the UK, with 
the strongest effect being found on university educated immigrants.16 
There were little discernible effects on the wages of the native-born. 
If the analysis above is repeated for less skilled UK-born workers a 
similar lack of association emerges. Some studies however have found 
evidence of small wage losses for UK-born workers in the bottom 
10% of the pay distribution alongside wage gains for those in the 
middle of the pay ladder as a result of immigration.17 However, these 
wage changes are very small; EU immigration between 2004 and 
2015 reduced wages for the bottom 10% of UK-born workers by 
only around 1% and raised wages for the average (median) worker 
by around 1.2%.
Another study has found small wage losses for all workers in particular 
occupations when immigration to the occupation increases.18 The main 
result is that all EU immigration since 2004 (over a period of 8 years) 
has reduced semi/unskilled services sector wages by less than 1%. 
This effect is likely to have been outweighed by other labour-market 
factors such as minimum wages which have increased by 4% over 
the same period.19
16 Manacorda et al. (2011).
17 Dustmann et al. (2013).
18 Nickell and Saleheen (2015). 
19 CER (2016).
Immigration and public finances
Immigration has had a positive impact on public finances 
although the size of the effect is small. A larger population means 
a bigger tax base. EU immigrants are young – their average age is 
3820 (compared to the UK average age of 40), they are more likely 
to work and less likely to be on benefits.21 The UK also gains when 
adult immigrants arrive, since UK taxpayers have not had to finance 
the childhood schooling and healthcare costs as they would do for a 
UK-born adult. In short, immigrants contribute more to fiscal revenues 
than they take up in expenditure.22 By contrast, UK nationals, as a 
whole, received more in benefits than they paid in taxes.
Access to benefits is a major public concern according to YouGov 
polling although, just like UK nationals, immigrants are not eligible 
for contributory-related benefits until they have worked full-time for 
two years.23 Furthermore, in 2016, government reduced access to 
benefits for immigrants from the EU. A further concern is that the 
large planned rises in the UK’s minimum wage – the National Living 
Wage – would draw in many more immigrants. However, it is unclear 
how big a draw this will be since it depends, in part, on what other 
countries do to their own wages and on the relative cost of living.
Empirical studies have found no clear link between increased 
immigration and access to public services. In education, there is 
evidence of a positive effect from Polish children on UK-born pupils 
(with the disadvantages from having English as a second language 
seemingly outweighed by a stronger immigrant push to work hard 
at school).24 Studies of the NHS find no greater usage of doctors and 
hospitals by immigrants relative to the UK-born; and little effect on 
NHS waiting times.25 Moreover, immigration has helped on the supply 
side: the UK-born are more likely to be cared for by an immigrant 
than be behind one in the queue. Studies that investigate the links 
between migration and competition for social housing or crime also 
do not find significant effects on average.26
20 The average age of immigrants from the A10 countries such as Poland and 
Latvia, is even lower at 32.
21 CER (2016).
22 Dustmann and Frattini (2014) find between 2001 and 2011 European migrants 
had a net fiscal contribution of £20 billion.
23 They are, however, eligible for means-tested benefits. HMRC estimates that 
around 6% of tax-credit claims are from households that include an EU national; 
this is in line with the share of EU nationals in the UK (House of Commons, 2014).
24 Geay et al. (2013).
25 See Wadsworth (2013) and Giuntella et al. (2015) 
26 See Battiston et al. (2013) and Bell et al. (2013).
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The impact of Brexit on immigration
The government has stated that controlling migration is a key priority 
in any new deal with the EU. EU membership puts migration decisions 
solely in the hands of EU citizens, as a precondition of access to the 
Single Market is the free movement of people. The previous section 
shows that while there might have been localised costs associated with 
this (in particular areas or occupations), in aggregate the costs and 
benefits to the UK workforce and economy were broadly balanced. 
Post Brexit, all migration and not just that for non-EU citizens will 
be based on UK policy decisions. While this is a change of direction, 
it puts the UK government on a par with most other countries 
around the world, few of which give unilateral free movement to 
the citizens of other countries. Moreover, this is not inconsistent 
with being a “pro-immigration” country in the spirit of Canada, 
Australia or New Zealand whose policies are intended to select the 
characteristics of migrants. 
It is important that UK immigration policy post-Brexit should be 
based on a set of clearly defined criteria which reflect a coherent 
view of what type of immigration is desirable. Although not the only 
criterion, contributing to the skills-base and talent pool needed for 
the UK economy to flourish is a central consideration if immigration 
is to support economic growth effectively.
A starting point would be to extend the visa scheme that applies to 
non-EU immigrants to EU nationals. Current rules effectively exclude 
non-EU immigrants from all but graduate jobs and limit numbers 
arriving on work visas each year to around 55,000.27 This could result 
in skills shortages. Some employers already find it hard to recruit and 
retain highly skilled and mobile non-EU workers which contributes 
to the skills shortages that are consistently reported by entrepreneurs 
and managers. It is essential that the visa system processes 
applications in a timely way and is properly resourced in order 
to enable businesses to attract the skilled labour that they need. 
In the year to September 2016, the UK granted almost 94,000 high-
skilled (Tier 2) visas to non-EU immigrants, a 1% increase on the year 
before.28 Immigration from EU countries has not been dependent on 
skills, qualifications or educational attainment. Nevertheless, many of 
the EU migrants have been highly educated: of the EU migrants in the 
working age population 45% have high and 42% have a medium level 
of educational attainment. Around 48% of EU migrants were working 
in skilled jobs in 2016, according to ONS Labour Force Survey data.
27 Non-EU migrants must apply for the Tier visas in a points based system. 
28 57% of these applications came from Indian nationals; and US nationals were the 
second largest group accounting for 10% of the total. The main sectors employing 
these recent migrants were IT (42%), professional, scientific and technical activities 
(19%) and finance (12%). See ONS Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, Dec 2016.
Given the current free movement of workers within the EU, the system 
post-Brexit will pose a new administrative burden on businesses 
seeking visas for EU workers. This is likely to make it harder to recruit 
and retain top talent and might also put off skilled EU migrants from 
wanting to come to the UK in the first place. The potential impact of 
Brexit on the university sector is of particular concern. The students 
and academics that have contributed to the success of UK universities 
come from all over the world, and the sector is a source of skills, 
innovation and exports in its own right. Parliament has established a 
Select Committee on the topic and evidence presented so far suggests 
that applications (from both EU and non-EU students) have fallen since 
the EU referendum, and that academics now consider the UK a less 
attractive place to work and conduct their research.
The low end of the skill distribution is also a challenge. The prosperity 
of many industries depends on access to low-skilled EU workers. EU 
migrants constitute 31% of employment in food manufacturing, 
23% in domestic personnel and 21% in accommodation.29 Unless 
firms can easily find native workers to fill these jobs, the output and 
competitiveness of these sectors is likely to fall due to staff shortages, 
and/or higher staff costs. When the criteria for visas are set, this 
should be based on a wide assessment of the labour market needs 
of UK businesses.
Policy recommendations 
The UK has a long-standing commitment to openness and this should 
be maintained as the UK forges new relationships with the EU and rest 
of the world. This means low tariff and non-tariff barriers, facilitating 
FDI (including welcoming foreign ownership of UK based business) 
and openness to global talent.
Brexit could be interpreted as a reversal of this traditional commitment 
to openness and the government has the opportunity to signal that it 
is not. The UK’s long-standing current account deficit underlines the 
importance of market access for exporters and protecting UK consumers 
and businesses from large increases in import prices. Research shows 
that Brexit will imply significant economic costs, but the “type” of 
Brexit will determine how large these costs are.
29 Resolution Foundation (2016).
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The political and legal frameworks governing Brexit are evolving 
quickly. At this stage, it seems that the UK will be seeking a bespoke 
deal with the EU. Though it is quite unlikely that the EU will offer 
the UK a similar arrangement, the government should look carefully 
at the Liechtenstein model where some of the economic benefits of 
market access are maintained, while retaining the capacity to control 
immigration and negotiate deals outside the EU. In particular:
•  The government should prioritize trade deals with its largest 
trade and investment partners – the EU and the US. Striking a 
free trade agreement with the US with a focus on reducing non-tariff 
barriers could provide a blueprint for other bilateral negotiations. 
Government should also be mindful of the medium term potential 
of fast growing emerging markets. 
•  The UK must negotiate market access for services, its key area 
of comparative advantage. This is likely to require maintaining 
most EU rules and regulations in this area. Mutual recognition of the 
importance of regulations affecting services underlines the importance 
of minimising non-tariff barriers to trade and should be on the table 
in any negotiation. The costs associated with such regulations should 
be weighed against the benefits from maintaining some preferential 
access to the single market. Negotiating a comprehensive deal is likely 
to take time. A temporary agreement, like EEA membership, has the 
attraction that it may mitigate the uncertainty among businesses and 
would also buy time to work out a permanent settlement.
•  Trade and FDI must be considered in tandem. Many of the sectors 
where the UK is a strong exporter are also host to high levels of 
FDI and are often engaged in global value chains. Barriers to trade 
(tariff and non-tariff) could lead firms to relocate activity into the 
single market in order to access intermediate goods more cheaply, as 
well as sell products more competitively. To counter these forces, an 
effective industrial strategy, improving the supply side environment 
through infrastructure, skills promotion, investment in science and 
coordinating government support for exporters will ensure that the 
UK continues to be an attractive location for firms in key sectors.
•  Continued strong engagement in international institutions. 
To foster constructive internationalism and the context for world 
trade at a time when they are under threat, the UK must continue 
to engage strongly in international institutions for trade, investment, 
aid and public goods. 
The UK must preserve its status as a magnet for talented 
individuals from around the world. An open approach to newcomers 
complements the natural advantages – including language, time zone 
and legal system – that make the UK a good place to study, work 
or build a business. The combined effect of immigration to date 
has been to create a stock of 7.4m working-age migrants, 3.4m of 
whom are highly educated. Yet the UK still faces skills shortages. The 
Commission proposes that:
•  Rather than pursuing a net migration target and limiting the 
numbers of visas for skilled workers granted, the UK should 
aspire to increase the stock of foreign-born skilled workers. 
A stock of foreign-born skilled labour below its current level is likely 
to constrain UK growth. After the UK leaves the EU, we will need 
to ensure that the new visa system for skilled workers is properly 
resourced and operates on a timely basis so as not to discourage 
such workers coming to the UK.
•  The government should clarify the immigration rights (and right 
to remain) of those who will become leading entrepreneurs, 
scientists, professionals and skilled practitioners. A dynamic 
economy relies on such people, refreshing the talent pool from those 
with a range of educational and cultural backgrounds as well as 
varied life experiences. At present, government policy is unclear on 
this issue which risks doing permanent damage to the economy. It 
is particularly important to maintain openness to bona fide students 
many of whom, if they stay in the UK after graduation, enhance the 
talent pool available to UK businesses. 
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The Bank of England’s main site on Threadneedle Street in London. The Bank was established in 1694.
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5.  Finance and Growth
The UK financial system has been in a process 
of transition since the financial crisis of 2008. 
Fundamental reforms of bank regulation, including 
new capital requirements and the separation of 
retail and commercial banking from wholesale and 
investment banking, have made the system safer. 
The banking sector remains large – with assets 
3.6 times annual GDP in 2016 – and an influential 
sector of the economy. Financial services are an 
important source of jobs and tax revenues, and 
a major component of the UK’s services exports, 
accounting for almost half of the UK’s services 
trade surplus.
Concerns with the UK financial system predated 
Brexit.  There is longstanding evidence of the 
system’s shortcomings in financing productive 
investment and supporting long-term growth. In 
recent years, the UK has seen the establishment 
of several new “challenger” banks. These new 
players together with new forms of intermediation, 
including crowdfunding, should help in principle to 
ease financial constraints faced by the corporate 
sector. However, UK businesses raise relatively 
little in capital markets and would benefit from 
diversifying their sources of funding. Further 
measures to enhance the functioning of equity 
markets and smaller firms’ access to bond markets 
are needed. 
The EU referendum result means that the UK 
financial sector will face new challenges. Given the 
sector’s significance for the UK economy, both as an 
export industry and an intermediary, Brexit could 
have wide-ranging implications for employment 
and growth across the UK. 
The UK financial system – a snapshot
The UK has been an important financial hub for centuries and its 
prominence in Europe predated the creation of the Single Market.1  The 
period before the financial crisis of 2008 saw the financial system balloon 
in size. On any measure, the financial system is many multiples of GDP. 
Between 1990 and 2016 the assets of the UK banking sector alone 
expanded from a multiple of about 2 to 3.6 times annual GDP  (Figure 5.1).
1 In the mid-1700s, London overtook Antwerp and Amsterdam as the centre of 
European finance (Carlos and Neal, 2011).


































































Notes: Figures include central bank assets. Source: Bank of England, ONS.
The financial sector spans a number of markets, mainly banking, asset 
management, and insurance. It plays a major role in employment, 
output, and tax revenues in the UK. In the decade before the 
financial crisis, measured output growth in the UK financial services 
sector averaged over 6% per year, compared with total GDP growth 
of 3% per year.2 In 2015 the financial sector employed around 
one million people directly. An additional one million people work 
in sectors that provide ancillary services, namely legal services, 
management consultancy, and accounting services. While those 
people are not directly employed by the financial services sector, 
their businesses form part of the ecosystem that supports it. The 
financial sector is also one of the UK’s leading export industries, 
with financial services trade alone accounting for 45% of the UK’s 
£95 billion surplus from trade in services. In 2016, key net exports 
included financial services (£43bn), business services (£31bn) and 
insurance and pension services (£18bn). The EU and the US are 
the UK’s top exports destinations for financial services, insurance 
and pension services, and other business services.
2 Burgess (2011).
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The financial crisis of 2008, which brought to light the dangers of 
an undercapitalised financial system, started a process of transition. 
Fundamental reforms of bank regulation, including the separation, 
or ring-fencing, of retail and commercial banking from investment 
banking, have made the system safer. New regulations induced 
banks to “deleverage” – reducing the ratio of their risk-bearing 
assets to their loss-absorbing equity. The capital position of UK 
banks has strengthened as a result of public recapitalisation and 
asset divestment. The sector has shrunk from its peak at the end of 
2008 when its assets stood at 4.7 times annual GDP. It remains large 
today – with assets 3.6 times annual GDP in 2016.
The financial sector as an intermediary – bank lending
The key function of the financial sector is to support growth by 
providing products that allow households to save, borrow, and 
insure themselves against risk. Bank lending is an important part 
of this: UK banks lend to other financial institutions, to businesses 
and to households. Since the financial crisis all of these forms of 
lending have fallen as a share of GDP, with intra-financial lending, 
and lending to business falling the most (Figure 5.2).
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While the supply of credit to UK households has generally been 
robust in recent years, there are concerns about the supply 
of credit to businesses. Over the past two decades the supply of 
credit to financial companies and the real estate sector boomed 
then contracted, leaving lending volumes to these sectors roughly 
160% above their 1997 level.3 By contrast, lending to non-financial 
and non-real estate companies expanded much less over the same 
period (by roughly 66%). Lending to the manufacturing sector was 
just under £37 billion at the end of Q3 2016, 17% below its 1997 
level (Figure 5.3).4
The financial crisis of 2008 hit business lending hard. Evidence 
suggests that factors influencing both supply and demand played 
a role. Demand was subdued because some businesses reacted to 
the economic slowdown of 2008-09 by repaying existing bank debt 
(deleveraging) and delayed investment plans in light of economic 
uncertainty. Research also suggests that tight credit supply may have 
reduced growth in the UK. Firms faced with a contraction in credit 
supply experienced a reduction in labour productivity, wages and the 
capital intensity of production.5 Surveys of SME managers show that 
3 Including finance, insurance and pensions, and auxiliaries.
4 Source: Bank of England, Industrial analysis of monetary financial institutions’ 
lending to UK residents.
5 Franklin et al. (2015).
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SMEs experienced a contraction in credit supply.6 Business lending 
in the UK is highly concentrated. The top 6 banks account for 70% 
of the stock of lending to UK firms.7 As a consequence, the level 
of credit supply by those banks can be an important determinant 
of firms’ ability to grow and invest. While credit conditions have 
improved in recent years, both for SMEs and large firms, some types 
of firm have not benefited, especially small and riskier firms seeking 
growth financing – in line with longstanding evidence of the system’s 
shortcomings in financing productive investment and supporting 
long-term growth.8 Overall, economic evidence suggests that 
tight credit supply to companies could be a factor in the UK’s 
disappointing growth and productivity performance in recent 
years.
Capital markets
Firms in the UK have traditionally been dependent on bank finance. A 
recent report by the British Business Bank showed that SMEs, which 
make up the vast majority of firms in the UK, raised only £2.4 billion 
from equity markets in the first three quarters of 2015, compared 
to £53 billion from bank lending.9
Capital markets, in which firms sell their bonds and equity stakes 
to investors including pension funds, insurers and individual savers, 
are an alternative conduit for funds to be channelled from savers 
to borrowers. Bond markets are a particularly important source of 
finance in the UK, with an increase in bond-market borrowing by 
companies offsetting the post-2008 reduction in corporate lending 
in the UK to some extent (Figure 5.4).
6 SME Finance Surveys and SME Finance. See also BIS (2012).
7 Bank of England (2015).
8 See e.g. Bank of England (2017).
9 British Business Bank (2016).











































Notes: Cumulative net funds raised by private non-financial corporations. 
Source: Bank of England, BankStats.
While bonds made up on average about 40% of total gross capital 
issuance by UK businesses between 2003 and 2016, bond markets 
are usually only available to large companies. A study covering 
around 3,600 UK companies between 1989 and 2011 found that 
90% of bond issues are larger than £60 million, and 90% of the 
issuers employ over 2,500 staff.10
Equity finance is relatively thin in the UK. Funds raised by UK firms 
in recent years have been negative, as companies “buy back” their 
own shares and reduce their equity outstanding (Figure 5.4). Such 
share buy-backs are a way to return cash to shareholders, and an 
alternative to dividends. Gross capital raising in the form of equity is 
relatively low too. Of the total capital issued in the UK between 2003 
and 2016, just 12.5% on average was equity, with the remainder 
being debt, or debt-like instruments. 
10 Pattani and Vera (2011).
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Many economists have noted that the pattern of corporate fundraising 
is influenced by the UK tax code. While the tax deductibility of debt in 
the UK is relatively generous by international standards, firms’ costs of 
equity issuance do not benefit from tax breaks. This generates a “debt 
bias” in favour of borrowing via debt rather than equity markets.11
The volume of trading on UK equity markets is a lower fraction of 
GDP than in the US (Figure 5.5). Some of this difference may be 
due to the sectoral composition of these markets. Highly-traded 
technology stocks comprise 21% of the S&P 500 index, but just 
above 1% of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. The relative 
lack of equity trading is a puzzle that appears to be growing. Since 
the 2008 crash the number of firms listed on an exchange in the UK 
has declined sharply year-on-year according to World Federation of 
Exchanges data, a pattern not seen in the US.



























































11 See, for example, Mirrlees et al. (2011).
Heavy reliance on banks combined with a relative lack of equity 
financing and limited access to bond markets for SMEs raise a series 
of concerns. Economies in which companies are highly leveraged 
are prone to lower investment, and lower growth. Reliance on 
debt in the past, and the associated “debt overhang”, has been cited 
as one of the potential reasons why global growth remains relatively 
sluggish in the aftermath of the crisis.12 The financial crisis induced 
a process of deleveraging in the UK, whereby firms retain profits to 
repay their debts. Active deleveraging through debt reduction entails 
a reduction in assets and hence productive capacity, and possibly 
a cutback of investment, with adverse feedback effects on firms’ 
earnings. The alternative is to increase the corporate equity base. 
A higher share of funding through equity would increase resilience 
and reduce corporate debt overhang. This would also improve loss 
absorbency and could kick-start investment.13 Therefore, it is important 
that UK firms achieve a healthy balance of debt and equity.
The UK also needs better equity markets in order to close the gap 
in the provision of growth capital for smaller and medium-sized 
businesses (SMEs) looking to expand.14 The issue is longstanding 
and was discussed in our first report.  The lack of growth capital could 
help partially explain the dearth of mid-sized businesses in the UK: 
firms that employ between 50 and 249 people represent less than 
1% of firms and only 12% of employment.15 Some progress has 
been made in this area. For example, the Business Growth Fund (BGF) 
has invested over £1 billion in more than 160 firms across the UK 
since its establishment in 2011.16 The British Business Bank combines 
private and public funds to make equity investments in high growth 
businesses. However, participants in our evidence session suggested 
that significant problems remain. In 2016 HM Treasury announced 
“The Patient Capital Review” to identify barriers to access to long-
term finance for growing innovative firms seeking to scale up. This 
is a welcome development.
New entrants – challenger banks
Given the longstanding concentration of the UK banking system, 
the launch of several new “challenger” banks in recent years 
is a welcome development. Research shows that firms’ ability to 
substitute among alternatives can shield the real economy from 
financial downturns.17 
12 Jorda et al. (2013) and Lo and Rogoff (2015).
13 Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2015).
14 BIS (2009) estimated that a growth capital gap exists between £2m and £10m.
15 BIS (2016).
16 The BGF was created to make long-term equity investments in growing SMEs. 
See BGF Portfolio Issue 5 for investments to date.
17 De Fiore and Uhlig (2015).
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The challenger landscape is varied. It includes large players like 
Clydesdale, Paragon and Yorkshire Banking Group; foreign entrants 
like Handelsbanken; the re-launch of old banks, including TSB. 
Established brands including Virgin, Asda, Marks and Spencer and 
Sainsbury’s Bank, are increasingly active in the provision of financial 
services. Newly established financial technology (FinTech) challengers 
include Atom, Fidor Bank, Monzo, and Starling.18
The assets of challenger banks are growing, while those of the Big 
Five high street lenders decline. According to a recent report by 
KPMG, the lending assets of challenger banks increased by 31.5% 
between 2014 and 2015 while those of the Big Five declined by 
almost 5%. On average, challenger banks offer better savings rates. 
In addition, SME banking is one of the challengers’ targeted niche 
markets. They have the potential to help close the funding gap in 
this market which is underserved by the Big Five.19
The Brexit shock
Financial markets, including the markets in which bank debt and 
equity trade, were volatile following the EU referendum of June 23rd 
2016. In the ten days that followed, banks’ equity prices dropped 
by an average of 20%, the largest two-week fall since the market 
crash of 2008. The share prices of the two state-owned banks, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, fell by 37% and 
29% respectively (Figure 5.6). Credit default swap (CDS) premia, 
a proxy for funding costs, rose for some banks. Trade-weighted 
sterling fell by 9%. Since then market turbulence has eased, with 
CDS premia falling to their levels before the EU referendum vote. 
Bank equity prices have recovered, though the two state-owned 
lenders, RBS and Lloyds are still well below the trading levels seen 
before the referendum.
With short-term pressure under control, questions turn to the medium 
and long-term impact of Brexit. Estimates show a significant impact 
is possible. For example, Oliver Wyman estimate that moving to a 
third-country status under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules 
would put at risk 40-50% of EU-related financial services activity 
(approximately £18-20 billion in revenue) and up to 31-35,000 jobs, 
along with around £3-5 billion of annual tax revenues.20 There is a lot 
of uncertainty around these medium and long-term repercussions. 
However, the UK banking sector – the part of the financial system 
that matters most for growth, relies mainly on domestic business 
for its revenues.
18 See KPMG (2016).
19 Challenger banks issued 32% of the UK’s business mortgages and charges in 
the first half of 2016 (Burnmark, 2016).
20 Oliver Wyman (2016).
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Notes: Equity prices rebased to 1 on the day of the referendum vote, 23rd June 
2016. Source: Bank of England. 
Old Street Shoreditch, nicknamed Silicon Roundabout, has 
become the centre of Britain’s booming fintech industry.
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The importance of financial services trade
Overall, the UK runs a large trade deficit, amounting to £39 billion in 
2016 (Figure 5.7). But services exports – the sales by UK companies of 
a service to overseas residents – are a key strength for the UK. Services 
exports generate a persistent surplus, with financial services accounting 
for 45% of it. In 2016, key net exports included financial services of 
£43 billion, business services of £31 billion and insurance and pension 
services of £18 billion.21 Business services include activities such as 
accounting, legal advice, and management consulting. These industries 
can be seen as “satellites” to the financial sector (among others), 
providing services that support financial and business transactions.
21 ONS: Balance of Payments – Release 23 December 2016. Data for 2016 only 
available up to Q3. Annual estimates are (Q1+Q2+Q3)*(4/3).





































































Notes: Data for 2016 only available up to Q3. Annual estimates are 
(Q1+Q2+Q3)*(4/3). Source: ONS: Balance of Payments - 23 Dec 2016 Release.
The UK is more reliant on financial services exports than any other 
G7 economy. Financial intermediation, insurance and real estate, 
and business services account for roughly 64% of the UK’s total 
gross services exports (Figure 5.8).
The importance of the EU in financial services trade
The EU and the US are the UK’s top export destinations for financial 
services, insurance and pension services, and other business services 
(Table 5.1). The UK exported over £81 billion in services to the EU in 
2014, 50% of which were in these three export markets combined. 
The EU represents 37% of the UK’s total exports of services, and the 
equivalent figure for the US is only 23%.
Traders at the London Metal Exchange, based in London. 
In 2016 their trade figures exceeded 10 trillion US dollars.
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Source: OECD 2015. Most recent available data: 2011.
The UK is currently a hub for international companies. This is true of 
financial institutions but also of non-financial businesses in general. 
The UK is home to over 250 foreign banks – more than any other 
hub. London hosts more than 40% of the European headquarters 
of the world’s largest 250 non-financial companies.22 Moreover, 
London is home to 60% of the top non-European companies with 
headquarters in Europe – with a strong presence of Asian companies. 
The UK currently hosts more headquarters of non-EU firms 
than Germany, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands put 
together.23 Outside the EU it may be harder to attract internationally 
mobile businesses: as an EU-based global financial centre, London 
has benefited from a “platform effect” through the EU’s passporting 
regime, whereby non-EU financial firms locate in the UK to gain a 
foothold in EU markets. London’s status as Europe’s main financial 
hub may have made the UK more attractive for foreign non-financial 
corporations, too. 
22 Its closest rival is Paris hosting just 8% of European headquarters (Deloitte, 2014).
23 Deloitte (2014). 
TABLE 5.1: UK EXPORTS OF FINANCIAL AND RELATED 
SERVICES BY DESTINATION (£bn)
  EU US World
Insurance & pension 2.5 9.3 20.1
Financial services 20.2 12.4 49.2
Other business services 18.3 14.4 57.1
Total finance & related services 41.0 36.0 126.5
Total services 81.3 50.6 219.8
Source: ONS Pink Book 2015. Latest available data 2014.
Financial services and the UK regions
Financial and related services companies are not based solely 
in London. Many have large offices in the UK regions. These 
decisions to locate outside London reflect the fact that many UK 
regions have financial expertise. Edinburgh and Glasgow are key 
centres for asset management, life assurance and banking with 
over 148,000 employees in Scotland. Newcastle and Sunderland 
are hubs for professional services. The North West hub consisting of 
banking, insurance, law and accountancy in and around Manchester 
and Liverpool employs 218,800 workers alone.
The South West employs 147,000 people with Bristol and Exeter as 
the centres of clusters of insurance and pensions businesses. Of the 
two million people employed in financial services and in associated 
professional services, The City of London Corporation estimates 
that more than half work outside London and the South East.24 This 
suggests that any decision to relocate as a result of Brexit would have 
implications for employment across the UK and not just for London.
Passporting and financial services trade
Research into the factors that support trade in services shows that the 
“gravity model” framework often used to analyse trade in goods is 
helpful.25 Trade flows between any two countries are influenced by 
their relative sizes and “proximity” (their physical distance but also 
economic and cultural proximity, measured by similarities between 
political and legal institutions, shared languages and colonial legacies). 
The more physically and economically “distant” two trading partners 
are, the greater the trade costs. As would be expected, empirical 
studies confirm that higher trade costs discourage trade in both 
goods and services.26
24 City of London Corporation (2013).
25 See e.g. Ebell (2016).
26 See Head and Mayer (2014).
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The major threat for financial services trade is the loss of 
passporting rights when the UK leaves the EU. The passporting 
regime is the foundation of the EU Single Market for financial 
services. It enables financial firms that are authorised in any EU or 
EEA (European Economic Area) country to trade freely in any other 
member state with minimal additional authorisation. In other words, a 
financial firm based in the UK (whether UK-owned or foreign-owned) 
has the right to provide a range of financial services anywhere in the 
EU/EEA, while being regulated by UK authorities.
Financial services passports cover a range of services, including 
traditional banking (such as lending and deposit taking), sales and 
trading of securities, and asset management. The basis for passports 
is the common adherence to EU Directives, which ensures harmonised 
standards for financial regulation and supervision. Passporting rights 
do not apply to third-country firms, i.e. firms incorporated outside 
the EU/EEA. Once the UK has left the EU and assuming it does not 
become a member of the EEA (since this would require free movement 
of people), it would become such a “third country”.
There are alternatives to passporting rights but they are costly and 
time-consuming. First, UK-based firms can create subsidiaries within 
the EU/EEA. Second, some EU legislation provides for third-country 
regimes that allow non-EU based firms to obtain a license to offer 
services in the EU if their home country regulatory regime is accepted 
by the EU as being equivalent to EU standards – that is the so-called 
“equivalence” principle. However these licences are not available in 
all EU countries, only apply to a limited number of services and are 
usually limited to one country at a time, meaning that the UK would 
have to negotiate with each individual country separately. They also 
provide less certainty, since they can be withdrawn unilaterally if the 
EU considers that the other party’s regulatory regime is no longer 
sufficiently equivalent to EU law. New research being undertaken by 
NIESR and the CEP suggests that free trade agreements are a poor 
substitute for Single Market membership. The loss of passporting 
rights could entail a reduction of over 25% in the UK’s total financial 
services trade.27
27 See Ebell and Roland (2017).
The future of trade in financial services
Emerging markets are both competitors and clients of the UK financial 
services industry. Financial centres in emerging markets, particularly 
China, are capturing an increasing share of the global profit pool 
and are eroding the UK’s leading position in some markets. Since 
the financial crisis, Hong Kong has overtaken the UK as an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) hub, and the UK lags behind Hong Kong, 
Singapore and the US in terms of offshore debt financing for Chinese 
corporates. However, emerging economies remain large importers 
of financial and related professional services from the UK, and 
there is scope for the UK to strengthen its position as a financial 
hub for emerging markets.
London already has a strong position in the trading of emerging- 
market financial instruments. For example, it is vying to become the 
leading offshore market for renminbi bonds. In 2016 the world’s first 
ever rupee- denominated bond issued outside of India by an Indian 
company was issued in London. The UK is also a global leader in 
foreign-currency clearing, overtaking Singapore as the largest clearing 
centre for the renminbi outside of greater China in 2016. Recent 
initiatives to increase collaboration between the UK and the financial 
sectors of India and China should help support this position.28
Another group of countries, the so-called “frontier economies” 
represent a long-term opportunity for countries, like the UK, that 
are home to financial hubs. This group includes Kenya, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Uganda, and Pakistan. Of the 25 countries 
forecast to grow the fastest over the next five years, 19 are frontier 
economies. Many of them have high demand for funds due to 
significant infrastructure financing needs related to the development 
of road and rail networks, airports and ports, and power generation. 
As these frontier economies issue debt overseas there is a role for 
the UK. Ensuring that the UK financial sector has strong links 
with this next generation of fast-growing economies is a long-
term priority.
It is important to note that deepening trade links with emerging 
markets and frontier economies will imply different challenges than 
those faced in the UK’s current relationship with the EU. European 
economies are similar to the UK in terms of institutional, legal, and 
regulatory frameworks. Differences in those areas, which generate 
trade costs for financial transactions, are expected to be higher with 
trading partners in emerging markets.
28 Notably the “Chinese Pilot Free Trade Zones” (FTZ) and the “India-UK Financial 
Partnership” initiatives (IUKFP).
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The growth of Islamic finance is another opportunity. The UK is already 
a strong player in this fast-growing area, which market analysts expect 
to be worth $3 trillion by 2018. The UK is the leading Western centre 
for Islamic finance with nearly twice as many institutions offering 
these services than in the US. The UK was the first Western country 
to issue a sovereign Islamic bond (“sukuk”). The UK continues to 
distinguish itself by its willingness to create a level playing field for 
Islamic institutions. Notably, the Bank of England has plans to put 
in place Shari’ah compliant central bank facilities.29
There are also prospects for improved services exports within the EU. 
The EU’s single market for services is much less developed than the 
market for goods. A recent all-party Parliamentary inquiry noted that 
while services account for over 70% of Europe’s output, they account 
for only 20% of trade, concluding that “there is no ‘single market 
in services’ in any meaningful sense of the term.” Several studies 
have found that trade costs are much higher in the services sector 
than in goods.30 The factors holding back services trade include the 
complexity of national and EU regulation and the diversity of services 
which mean that the single services market is hard to “complete” 
by defining one single harmonised set of rules. Economic research 
confirms this, finding that within the EU there are considerable 
differences in services trade costs across member countries.31
There are many plans to build up the EU’s single market for services, 
including financial services. A number of initiatives were set out in 
the European Commission’s 2015 “Single Market Strategy”. These 
include proposals to introduce a “Services Passport” and remove 
barriers to the trade of business services. Other initiatives include 
the development of the Digital Single Market and plans to create a 
Capital Markets Union. An EU digital single market may benefit the 
UK FinTech industry if it can access it. The Capital Markets Union 
will aim to develop a more diversified financial system (less reliant on 
bank financing) and facilitate equity and corporate debt investments 
across borders – resulting in a better connection between financing 
and investment projects across the EU and more capital market 
funding for SMEs.
29 Islamic banks are currently unable to use the Bank’s existing liquidity facilities 
because interest-based facilities are not deemed Shari’ah compliant.
30 See Miroudot et al. (2015) and Sáez and Taglioni (2016).
31 See e.g. Miroudot, Sauvage, and Shepherd (2013).
These efforts to complete the EU’s single market for services are 
predicted to yield significant gains for the EU’s members.32 While 
the UK will not enjoy all the benefits of deeper EU integration 
outside the EU, it is likely that improvements in the market for 
financial services spill-over to the EU’s trading partners. The 
UK could therefore benefit. The extent to which the UK gains will 
depend on the pace of EU reforms, and the UK’s ability to negotiate 
access to newly integrated markets for services and capital. Finally, 
the UK will also benefit indirectly from greater financial stability 
within the Eurozone resulting from the Banking Union.
Brexit and the supply of finance
The EU referendum result of June 2016 implies new challenges for 
the UK financial system. The transition to a new relationship with 
the EU could put a drag on growth either via heightened uncertainty 
or the intensification of existing financial constraints.
Uncertainty
Increases in uncertainty are associated with declines in investment.33 
Since large investment decisions (for example, building new factories 
or buying new equipment) are difficult to unwind, CEOs need to be 
relatively confident about their firm’s future path before they commit. 
Demand for finance is already subdued. The proportion of SMEs that 
are expecting not to seek new funds in the future has increased from 
63% in 2012 to 76% in Q2 2016.34 Uncertainty may be playing a 
role in this. Decreased investment can in turn reduce future growth 
prospects. Economic uncertainty reached record highs in June and July 
2016, at the time of the referendum and in its immediate aftermath 
(Figure 5.9).35 There was another spike around the time of the High 
Court ruling on the Brexit process in November 2016.
32 The potential annual gains from a Digital Single Market are estimated at 3 to 3.6 
per cent of EU GDP (Dunne (Ed.), 2015). The Capital Markets Union could facilitate 
large amounts of additional bank credit to the private sector and SMEs by reviving 
securitisation (European Commission, 2015).
33 See Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007).
34 BDRC Continental (2016).
35 Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015).
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Notes: The index is based on newspaper articles regarding economic policy 
uncertainty. Source: Baker et al. (2017).
Studies on the economic implications of political uncertainty suggest 
that it can dull growth. Unclear political outcomes can lead to higher 
debt-financing costs.36 Equity financing, already limited in the UK, 
can also become more expensive, particularly when underlying 
economic conditions weaken.37 Other studies show that firms can 
pause investment, awaiting the resolution of political uncertainty.38 
This suggests there is a risk that political uncertainty surrounding 
the Brexit process may compound the negative impact on growth 
of economic uncertainty.
While economic uncertainty and policy will affect all types of firms, 
it is likely that its implications will be different for large firms and 
SMEs. Among others, two important factors will play a role in 
determining the severity of the impact on any particular firm: the 
financial constraints it faces and its degree of export orientation. A 
firm will more likely be affected if it is export oriented and financially 
constrained.
36 See e.g. Waisman et al. (2015).
37 See e.g. Pastor and Veronesi (2013).
38 See e.g. Julio and Yook (2012).
Firms that focus on the domestic market may be somewhat 
insulated from uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, as 
their business model does not depend on the shape of the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU. As only 9% of SMEs are export oriented 
and a further 15% are in the supply chains of other businesses that 
export, uncertainty surrounding new trade agreements is likely to 
mainly affect larger firms directly. At the same time, any firm using 
imported inputs may face cost pressures if import prices rise.39  
Threats to bank lending to corporates
SMEs are more likely than large firms to be affected by financial 
constraints.  Difficulties will be compounded for those that are 
growing, or have plans to start serving new export markets. Survey 
data around the time of the referendum suggest that during the 
referendum campaign, the proportion of SMEs rating either the 
current economic climate or political uncertainty as major barriers 
increased for larger SMEs and those engaged in international trade.40 
These firms are heavily reliant on bank debt and banks dislike the 
increased credit risk that goes with heightened uncertainty. 
Recent evidence shows that financial frictions faced by firms can 
amplify the impact of uncertainty shocks on firms’ investment. This 
is because uncertainty induces firms to hoard cash as a precautionary 
motive, at the expense of capital investment and labour demand.41 
This is a serious concern given that around 60% of the UK labour 
force works for micro and small and medium sized firms that are 
typically exposed to financial constraints.
Market-based finance for UK companies may also be affected 
by the downgrade of the UK’s sovereign rating. Shortly after the 
referendum in June 2016, two major rating agencies downgraded the 
UK’s rating. The three major agencies warned that more downgrades 
could follow and that the most likely trigger for another downgrade 
would be the UK’s loss of access to the Single Market. Since sovereign 
ratings tend to form a ceiling for the ratings of individual corporates, 
companies’ ratings could also fall, and their debt costs rise. Thankfully, 
this possibility has not materialised yet with the latest Bank of England 
data showing no deterioration in corporate credit conditions.42
39 BIS (2016a).
40 BDRC Continental (2016).
41 Alfaro, Bloom and Lin (2016).
42 Bank of England, Credit Conditions Review Q4 2016.
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Overseas financing and currency risk
UK companies depend on a range of finance sources from overseas. 
This is another area where Brexit may have an impact. At Q2 2016, 
UK resident financial corporations had 63% of their debt securities 
denominated in foreign currencies (mainly USD and EUR). The share 
stood at 38% for UK resident non-financial corporations.43 Liabilities 
in foreign currencies create exchange rate risk exposure and the need 
to insure against this risk. Large companies on the whole look well 
insulated. Many have foreign currency earnings, providing a “natural 
hedge”. As sterling has depreciated the equity value of many FTSE 
companies has risen, reflecting the increased sterling value of their 
foreign currency earnings. Smaller companies involved in import and 
export of goods are likely to be less well insulated.
In the absence of a natural hedge, companies can use the foreign 
exchange (FX) market to protect (‘hedge’) themselves against 
unexpected changes in the exchange rate that affect their returns. 
There are a number of instruments for hedging currency risk. A large 
proportion of FX market turnover is simply transactions in the spot 
market, but UK non-financial corporations also make use of other 
instruments, in particular swaps and forward contracts.
Hedging of currency risk by UK corporates rose before the referendum 
vote. The survey of over 2,600 companies conducted over four 
weeks in March 2016 shows that over half had hedged against FX 
exposures, including over a fifth of SMEs, in preparation for currency 
fluctuations following a leave vote in the referendum44. Yet many 
SMEs may still be exposed to currency risk: survey evidence shows 
that small companies are far less likely to hedge against currency 
risk than larger ones. Setting a clear path for the UK’s exit from 
the EU should help alleviate exchange rate volatility.
43 Bank for International Settlements, Debt Securities Statistics.
44 East & Partners (2016).
EU funding and foreign direct investment
The UK economy benefits from a wide range of EU funding 
programmes, especially through the European Investment Bank 
Group, comprised of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Investment Fund (EIF), and through the recently established 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). These schemes target 
market failures, particularly the lack of financing for growing SMEs and 
large infrastructure projects. The UK is among the largest beneficiaries 
of EIF and EFSI funding: over 2011-2015 the EIB invested around 
£23.5 billion in the British economy. Some of the EIB’s major projects 
in the UK include a £150m loan for the Liverpool port expansion 
approved in 2012, a £200 million loan for Oxford University for the 
expansion of research and teaching facilities approved in 2015, and 
£360 million to support the roll-out of smart meters to reduce energy 
use across the UK approved in 2015.
While the EFSI is focussed on large-scale strategic investments (such 
as renewable energy, digital infrastructure, transport and R&D), 
the EIF has a strong focus on SMEs. The EIF supports SMEs through 
three funding channels: private equity and venture capital (VC) 
funds, guarantees and securitisation transactions, and microfinance. 
Between 2011 and 2015, the EIF committed £2.3 billion to its equity 
programmes, £438 million for guarantees and securitisation, and £15 
million for microfinance in the UK. Importantly, EIF commitments 
mobilise funds from private investors and institutions, so mobilised 
funds are a multiple of EIF commitments. Outside the EU it is not 
clear whether and to what extent the UK will continue to 
benefit from these funds.
The British Business Bank (BBB) could act as a substitute for 
these funds. Since EU State Aid rules will no longer apply after 
Brexit, there is a potential for the BBB to do more. However, the 
BBB remains small and does not mobilise as much additional private 
capital as the EIB. Boosting the BBB’s funds will be a priority should 
the UK lose access to the EU schemes.
A new infrastructure bank should be established to work closely 
with the NIC, in order to reduce and manage risk in the critical early 
stages of infrastructure projects. This type of institution was proposed 
in the Growth Commission’s first report, and would be still more 
valuable should the UK lose access to EIB and other EU funds. It is 
also important to ensure that the Green Investment Bank continues 
to operate effectively as a development bank.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another alternative source of 
funds. The UK is one of the largest recipients of FDI in the EU, 
and the bulk of UK inward FDI has come from EU countries. 
Around 26% of UK inward FDI stocks relate to financial services 
alone. Outside the EU, firms in the UK might find it more difficult 
to raise funds; empirical studies have shown that FDI is supported 
by EU membership.45
Competition from EU banks
The UK’s exit from the EU may affect corporate financial conditions 
by making it harder for European providers of finance in Britain. The 
share of lending to UK private sector residents coming from EU banks 
is larger than that coming from US banks and banks from the rest of 
the world. Decreased lending activities by EU banks in the UK could 
result in weaker competition. This in turn could increase the cost and 
decrease the supply of bank finance. Recent research at the OECD 
finds that countries that have less restrictive commercial banking 
systems have more efficient and competitive credit and insurance 
markets.46 However, the magnitude of this kind of supply shock is 
likely to be small. UK banks account for the lion’s share of loans 
to private sector residents. Most of the UK’s cross-border banking 
assets and liabilities are with other banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, as opposed to non-financial firms.
While the EU is clearly important to the UK, it is important to 
note that the UK is vital to the EU financial system too. At the 
end of 2016, 98 companies incorporated in the EU were listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, with a market capitalisation of £424 
billion. Furthermore, it is unclear whether businesses that decide to 
leave the UK would relocate to EU financial centres, such as Paris 
or Frankfurt, or to global financial hubs, such as New York, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore. Should businesses relocate outside the EU, 
this would have negative consequences for the European Union as 
a whole, not just the UK.
45 Dhingra et al. (2016b).
46 Nordås and Rouzet (2015).
Policy recommendations
The Commission’s evidence gathering and submissions suggest that 
growth supporting measures include ensuring access to EU markets, 
building new links with emerging markets, widening small firms’ 
access to capital markets and encouraging long-term investment 
(“patient capital”).
Ensure access to EU markets by developing a substitute for the 
financial services passport. The government should ensure access 
for UK services firms, including financial and business services. The 
loss of passporting rights is a threat to UK financial services across 
the country and some institutions have already warned of job losses 
and relocation of business out of the UK. Existing models of access, 
including that followed by the Swiss, come with concessions, both 
on contributions to the EU budget and the free movement of people 
and may be hard for the UK to secure. Nevertheless, it is key to 
secure access rights that are as close as possible to those granted 
by passports.
It is therefore likely that harmonised rules and regulations will be 
required in any deal with the EU. Since negotiations may be a lengthy 
process, a transitional agreement may help mitigate uncertainty 
among businesses.
Strengthen existing links with fast-growing economies, and 
forge new ones. Build new links with non-EU global financial 
centres, especially in fast-growing emerging markets such as China, 
India and Korea, and get a foothold in frontier economies, such as 
Nigeria and Kenya. The UK already has a strong position as a hub for 
emerging market finance, with particularly strong links with China and 
India. Emerging markets remain large importers of financial services 
and their process of financial deepening is in its infancy. Chinese 
financial markets are gradually opening up and the UK can play an 
important role in this process. Therefore, the Financial Services Trade 
and Investment Board (FSTIB) should continue to aim to strengthen 
the UK’s position as the centre of emerging market finance.
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Widen access to bond markets. The British Business Bank (BBB) 
could play a key role in creating a corporate bond market for SMEs, 
including efforts to kick-start SME loan securitisation along the 
lines of its ENABLE Funding programme for asset-based financing.47 
Boost equity tax relief schemes for investors in growing small 
and mid-sized companies. Outside of the EU, the Equity Investment 
Scheme (EIS) and the Seed Equity Investment Scheme (SEIS) could be 
expanded since they would no longer be subject to EU regulations 
on State Aid.
Improve the provision of patient capital. The new “Patient Capital 
review” led by the Treasury is a welcome development. It should 
explore how corporate governance requirements, including reporting 
and investor engagement, should be designed to create incentives 
for long-term equity investment.48 It should also explore how large 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and life insurers, could 
play a stronger role in supplying long-term finance for growing 
innovative firms. Institutional investors are “natural” long-term 
investors due to the often long-term nature of their liabilities. Finally, 
the BBB should scale up its current activities to mobilise long-term 
funding from the private sector. 
Support challenger banks. The UK’s new breed of challenger banks 
are well placed to make the UK banking market more competitive 
and innovative. Their development could be supported by utilising 
flexibility on capital requirements for smaller lenders that will now 
be possible outside the EU.
Support the FinTech sector. Along with steps on visas for high-
skilled workers set out in previous chapters the government should 
develop initiatives to boost investment in this sector, including giving 
FinTech investors clear and enhanced access to tax relief schemes, 
such as the Equity Investment Scheme (EIS) and the Seed Equity 
Investment Scheme (SEIS).
47 Launched in 2014, ENABLE Funding is a programme aimed at pooling and 
securitising the asset finance receivables of smaller UK businesses. The programme 
is still in the pooling stage where receivables from various originators are being 
warehoused. Once a critical mass has been reached the BBB plans to securitise the 
aggregated pools of receivables by issuing asset backed securities or other forms 
of debt to institutional investors.
48 Kay (2012).
Strengthen the British Business Bank. Where market failures 
exist, expand the role of the BBB using flexibilities not possible under 
EU rules. This added flexibility could give the BBB a pivotal role in 
supporting the UK’s Industrial Strategy.
A new infrastructure bank. This should be created to improve the 
financing of infrastructure projects. It is also crucial to preserve the 
strengths of the highly successful Green Investment Bank.
Some of these steps are easier than others. Together, they should 
ensure that the UK financial system contributes to growth across 
the UK. One risk is the temptation to improve the UK’s short-term 
competitiveness as a financial hub by eroding regulatory quality, at 
the cost of lower financial systemic stability in the long-term. So while 
leaving the EU provides some flexibility, the UK must continue to 
play a leading role in the international groups that have a financial 
stability remit, including the IMF and the FSB.49 Outside the EU 
the UK must be true to its history and compete on the quality 
of its financial sector, not on the laxity of its financial stability 
requirements.
49 See e.g. HM Government (2014).
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